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We shall not cease from exploration. And the end of all 
our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know 
the place for the first time. 
T. S. Eliot1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The hybrid nature of limited liability companies causes us to re-invent, 
or at least re-examine, many doctrinal wheels. 2 This Article will re-
examine one of the most practical of those wheels-the distinction between 
1 T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 59 (Harvest Books 1968) ( 1943). 
2 See Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability 
Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 90--91 (1994) (stating that the LLCs' "combination 
of ... corporate and partnership attributes creates difficulties for courts when deciding whether to 
apply ... corporate and partnership doctrines to limited liability companies[]" and arguing that 
courts should develop new doctrines where needed instead of adopting all corporate or all 
partnership common law rules); Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional 
Service Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 Bus. LAW. 1387, 1393 (2003) (defining LLCs as hybrid 
organizations offering some of the advantages of both corporations and partnerships); Daniel S. 
Kleinberger, Sorting Through the Soup: How do LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs Fit Within the 
Regulations and Legal Doctrines?, 13 BUS. L. TODAY 15, 15 (2003) [hereinafter Kleinberger, 
Soup]; DanielS. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 838-40, 842-43, 868-75 (2005) [hereinafter Kleinberger, Prism]; 
Thomas E. Rutledge, The Lost Distinction Between Agency and Decisional Authority: 
Unfortunate Consequences of the Member-Managed Versus Manager-Managed Distinction in 
the Limited Liability Company, 93 KY. L.J. 737, 738 (2004-2005). See generally 1 CARTER G. 
BISHOP & DANIELS. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW 
'1]1.03 (2003 & Supp. 2005). 
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direct and derivative claims in the context of a closely-held limited liability 
company. 
Case law concerning the direct/derivative distinction is still 
overwhelmingly from the law of corporations/ although LLC cases are now 
being reported with some frequency. LLC.cases routinely analogize to, or 
borrow from, the corporate law. 4 This Article encompasses that law, 
analyzes LLC developments, and argues that courts should (i) avoid the 
"special injury" rule, (ii) embrace the "direct harm" approach, and (iii) 
engraft to the direct harm approach an exception applicable when those in 
control of a limited liability company harm the company with the "purpose 
and effect" of injuring a particular member. The analysis proceeds as 
follows: 
Part II - The Relevance of Corporate Case Law. 
Part III - Why the Direct/Derivative Distinction Matters 
Practically. 
Part IV - The Conceptual Fundamentals for Making the 
Distinction (Without Regard to Closely Held Character). 
Part V - A Special Rule for Closely Held Entities. 
Part VI - Special Queries with Regard to Limited Liability 
Companies. 
Part VII - How the Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act Proposes to Address the Matter. 
Part VIII - Conclusion. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE CASE LAW 
The data is overwhelming. 5 Almost all LLC cases addressing the 
direct/derivative distinction follow rules developed in corporate-law cases. 
3 E.g., VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2003 WL 723285, at *II (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 
2003) ("[The] provision [in the Delaware LLC statute providing for derivative suits] originates 
from the well-developed body of Delaware law governing derivative suits by stockholders of a 
corporation. Accordingly, case law governing corporate derivative suits is equally applicable to 
suits on behalf of an LLC."); see also infra Part II. 
4 See id. 
5 One treatise offers the following collection of cases: 
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For cases using the corporate analogy, see Safety Techs., L.C. v. Biotronix 2000, Inc., 
136 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (D. Kan. 2001) ("The court believes that the Kansas 
Supreme Court would also apply [corporate] precedent limiting lawsuits by individual 
shareholders to limit lawsuits by members of limited liability companies . . . . The 
rationale of the rule, preventing the danger of multiplicitous suits by each 
shareholder ... applies equally to corporations and limited liability companies"). But 
see Ayres v. AG Processing, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1208 (D. Kan. 2004) (stating, 
with reference to Nebraska law, that "the Court is not convinced that [corporate] law 
should apply to members of a LLC" but eschewing a decision on the issue because the 
corporate rule would allow the plaintiffs to bring a direct claim). See also Glod v. 
Baker, 2002-988, 2003 WL 21804398, at *6 (La. 3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2003) (quoting with 
approval the trial court's observation that the same direct/derivative issues arise in 
"closely held corporations, partnerships or limited liability companies owned by a very 
few people, who are ... severely personally damaged as a result of the wrongs done to 
their entities," but discussing corporate precedent in detail and at length). For a case 
applying corporate principles and terminology without noticing that the "entity" 
involved was an LLC, see Giuliano v. Pastina, 793 A.2d 1035, 1036-37 (RI 2002) 
(repeatedly referring to plaintiffs ownership interest in Plainridge Racing Company, 
LLC as "a shareholder's ownership interest," and affirming dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint because "the plaintiffs claims, if valid, belonged to the corporation"). See 
also Paclink Communications Int'l, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (Ct. 
App.-2d Dist. 2001) and Taurus Advisory Group, Inc. v. Sector Management, Inc., 
1996 WL 502187 *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1996); Taurus Advisory Group, Inc. v. 
Sector Mgmt., Inc. No. CV 960150830, 1997 WL 241153 at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 
6, 1997) (reiterating the earlier holding and noting that, although the facts underlying 
the direct claims may also implicate "claims on behalf of Taurus L.L.C., '[w]here a 
shareholder's complaint sets out a cause of action that is both individual and derivative, 
the shareholder may proceed with the individual action"') (quoting Moran v. Household 
lnt'I, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). 
Accord Ayres v. AG Processing, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (D. Kan. 2004). The 
door swings both ways. See Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 5:99-CV-274, 2000 
WL 1357711 at *13 (ED Tex., Sept. 18, 2000) (analyzing the direct/derivative question 
for corporations and citing, inter alia, an LLC case, In Beaver Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Lakehouse, L.L.C., 742 So.2d 159 (Ala. 1999)). 
2 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 10.01[2][b] n.39.1; see also Dawson v. Atlanta 
Design Assocs., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 877, 880 n.l (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (relying on a partnership case, 
which in tum had relied on a corporate case, and stating that "[n]either party argues in its brief to 
this Court, and we see no reason why, the teaching of Energy Investors [the partnership case that 
quoted the corporate case] should not apply to limited liability companies" (citing Energy 
Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constr. Inc., 525 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. 2000)). 
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Recent examples of this reliance include Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC,6 
So/utia Inc. v. FMC Corp./ DDH Aviation, L.L.C. v. Hol/y, 8 and Godfrey v. 
Lafavour.·9 
6 615 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ("Because the LLCs at issue are all closely held entities 
with some corporate characteristics, we address this issue by looking to the analogous situation 
presented under similar circumstances in the context of closely held corporations."). 
7 385 F. Supp. 2d 324, 331 n.l (S.D.N. Y. 2005) (stating that "New York corporate law applies 
in full force to limited liability companies" in matters relating to derivative suits). The case 
repeatedly refers to shareholders, but acknowledges that the joint venture vehicle at issue was a 
Delaware limited liability company. /d. at 331 (stating that the parties became "shareholders in a 
Delaware limited liability company"). 
8 No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2598-P, 2005 WL 770595, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2005) (rejecting 
the application of a statutory exception for closely-held-corporation shareholders [allowing 
derivative claims brought by such shareholders to be treated as direct claims] to claims by 
members of a closely held LLC, but only because the plaintiffs had not claimed in their pleadings 
the entity was closely held). Contra Ayres v. AG Processing Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1206--09 
(D. Kan. 2004) (stating that (i) the court could find no Nebraska precedent; (ii) "the Court is not 
convinced that [the corporate rule] should apply to members of a LLC[;]" and (iii) declining to 
decide the question because the plaintiffs would qualify under the corporate rule to bring a direct 
action). But see Safety Techs., L.C. v. Biotronix 2000, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (D. 
Kan. 2001) ("The court believes that the Kansas Supreme Court would also apply [corporate] 
precedent limiting lawsuits by individual shareholders to limit lawsuits by members of limited 
liability companies. The rationale of the rule, preventing the danger of multiplicitous suits by 
each shareholder, applies equally to corporations and limited liability companies.") (citations 
omitted). 
9 No. 105-005 CV JWS, 2005 WL 2340714, at *4 (D. Alaska Sept. 12, 2005) (applying in an 
LLC case and without explanation the corporate rule that a direct claim exists only '" (I) where the 
shareholder suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, and 
(2) where there is a special duty, such as a contractual duty, between the alleged wrongdoer and 
the shareholder"' (citing Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogo Kaisha, Inc., 713 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Ala. 1986)); 
see also Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999) ("The derivative suit 
is a corporate concept grafted onto the limited liability company form."); Monroe v. Baron One, 
LLC, 902 So. 2d 529, 531-35 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (directly applying corporate rules, without any 
mention of the fact that an LLC was involved); Gottsacker v. Monnier, 697 N.W.2d 436, 448 n.4 
(Wis. 2005) (Roggensack, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he concept of derivative claims has been 
engrafted into the law of limited liability companies"); Albers v. Guthy-Renker Corp., No. 02-
56673, 2004 WL 540697, at *I (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2004) (applying the corporate rule to determine 
that members of an LLC did not have standing to sue for alleged misrepresentations by the 
defendant, which caused the LLC to lose money and noting that the fact "[t]hat [the plaintiffs' 
company] is a limited liability company ... rather than a corporation, does not change this 
result"); Taurus Advisory Group, Inc. v. Sector Mgrnt., Inc., No. CV 960150830, 1997 WL 
241153, at *2-*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6, 1997) (applying the corporate special injury rule "by 
way of analogy"). 
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The derivative nature of the LLC case law makes conceptual sense. 
Courts understand the direct/derivative distinction as a separate entity 
characteristic, 10 which they associate with corporateness. 11 An LLC is 
emphatically an entity separate from its members, 12 and so it follows that 
the corporate approach to the direct/derivative distinction should carry over 
into the law of LLCs. 13 Indeed, even when a court looks to a partnership 
10 Kieinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 859-63. 
11 E.g., Bailey v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 251, 257 (2002) (stating that corporations are 
separate entities, that shareholders therefore do not have a legal interest in the corporation's 
property, and that injuries to the corporation's property are "recoverable only by the corporation in 
a direct action or by the shareholders in a derivative action") (quoting Crocker v. Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 826 F.2d 347,349 (5th Cir. 1987)); Moore v. Simon Enters., Inc., 919 F. Supp. I007, 1012 
(N.D. Tex. 1995) ("Under corporate law, a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its 
shareholders and not even a person owning all of a corporation's shares can represent the interests 
of the corporation in a lawsuit."); Sabey v. Howard Johnson & Co., 5 P.3d 730, 735 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2000) ("Ordinarily, a shareholder cannot sue for wrongs done to a corporation, because the 
corporation is a separate entity: the shareholder's interest is viewed as too removed to meet the 
standing requirements. Even a shareholder who owns all or most of the stock, but who suffers 
damages only indirectly as a shareholder, cannot sue as an individual.") (footnote omitted). 
12 See, e.g., SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 375 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 
(S.D.N. Y. 2005) ("Under Delaware law, a limited liability company ... is a 'separate legal entity' 
distinct from the members who own an interest in the LLC."); Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, 
No. 97 C 1320, I997 WL 285938, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23, I997) ("[I]t is this characteristic of 
limited liability companies-their distinct legal existence as an entity apart from their constituent 
members-which allows them to shield their members from personal liability and distinguishes 
them from both general and limited partnerships."); In re Watson, 322 B.R. 740, 747 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2005) ("[T]he individual who establishes a corporation or a limited liability company for 
the purpose of business operation and asset ownership has created a wholly separate, legally 
identifiable entity apart from his individual legal existence."); see also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT 
§ 20I (rev. 1996), 6A U.L.A. 578 (1996) (stating that "[a] limited liability company is a legal 
entity distinct from its members"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § I8-20I(b) (2005) (stating that "[a] 
limited liability company formed under this chapter shall be a separate legal entity"); see 
generally I BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 5.05[1J[e]. 
13 See Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 6I5 S.E.2d I, 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ("Because the LLCs at 
issue are all closely held entities with some corporate characteristics, we address this issue by 
looking to the analogous situation presented under similar circumstances in the context of closely 
held corporations."); see also In re Real Marketing Servs., LLC, 309 B.R. 783, 788 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. 2004) (determining whether the bankruptcy estate of an LLC owned particular claims by 
(i) first noting that "[a]n action is derivative of the corporation's rights, and hence not independent 
of them, if 'the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation ... or it seeks to recover 
assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets,'" and then (ii) holding that 
"[w]ith regard to limited liability corporations ("LLC's"), members of an LLC hold no direct 
ownership interest in the company's assets and therefore are not directly injured when the 
company suffers an improper deprivation of those assets"). In support of its position, the court 
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case as precedent, the ultimate source remains the same. 14 The partnership 
law in this area itself derives from corporate cases. 15 
As explained in Part III, the direct/derivative case law can be divided 
into three subcategories, depending on which of three approaches the court 
has used to make the direct/derivative distinction. 16 In general, the LLC-
corporate connection carries through into these subcategories. Where the 
corporate rule is direct harm, that rule will typically apply to LLCs as 
cited and quoted PacLink Commnications International, Inc. v. Superior Court, I 09 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
436 (2001), an LLC case, which in tum had cited Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 
(Cal. 1969), a corporate case. 
14 E.g., Dawson v. Atlanta Design Assocs., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 877, 880 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2001) (applying a variation of the special injury rule, borrowed from a partnership case, which in 
tum had applied the rule used in corporate cases: "We acknowledge that the business entity at 
issue in Energy Investors was a partnership, while the business entity at issue in the case sub 
judice is a limited liability company. Neither party argues in its brief to this Court, and we see no 
reason why, the teaching of Energy Investors should not apply to limited liability companies." 
(citing Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constr. Inc., 525 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. 2000)). 
15 Lenz v. Associated Inns & Rests. Co. of Am., 833 F. Supp. 362, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y.1993) 
("In both the corporate and partnership context, the determination of whether a suit is derivative or 
direct turns on the nature of the injury alleged and the entity which sustains the harm."); see also 
Abeloffv. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 332, 334 (D. Mass. 1988) (requiring the procedures of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23.1 to be followed in a derivative suit filed by limited partners against general 
partners, even though the rule only refers to corporations: "Although this rule speaks in terms of 
shareholders of corporations, there appears to be no dispute that it is equally applicable to 
partnerships."); Strain v. Seven Hills Assocs., 75 A.D.2d 360, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) 
(finding that a limited partner could bring a derivative lawsuit against a general partner for breach 
of fiduciary duty, in part through a comparison to a corporate case: "By logical extension it 
appears that a limited partner's power to vindicate a wrong done to the limited partnership and to 
enforce redress for the loss or diminution in value of his interest is no greater than that of a 
stockholder of a corporation."); Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Int'1 Fund, L.P., 829 
A.2d 143, 149-50 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("The test for distinguishing direct from derivative claims in 
the context of a limited partnership is substantially the same as that used when the underlying 
entity is a corporation .... The test looks to the nature of the injury and to the nature of remedy 
that could result if the plaintiffs are successful.") (footnotes omitted); Dawson, 55! S.E.2d at 880 
n.l (determining the issue in an LLC case by relying on a partnership case, which in tum had 
applied the rule used in corporate cases); Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249-51 
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.) (applying without comment the corporate direct harm rule to 
hold that the plaintiffs, Nauslar Investments, LLC, the limited partner in a partnership and the 
limited partner in that partnership's general partner and Nausler, sole member and owner of 
Nausler Investments, LLC, could not assert a direct injury against the defendant for unreasonably 
disapproving the partnership merger with another entity; explaining that it was the partnership 
that suffered the direct injury-harm to its value--and loss to the plaintiffs from its lower sale 
price was derivative of the partnership's right of action). 
16 See infra Part III. 
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well. 17 So too in jurisdictions applying the special injury rule or the rule of 
"duty owed" or "rights infringed."18 
Ill. WHY THE DIRECT/DERIVATIVE DISTINCTION MATTERS 
PRACTICALL Y19 
The direct/derivative distinction is governed by the law of the entity's 
jurisdiction of organization20 and has at least five major practical 
ramifications: the risk of dismissal for mistaking the distinction, the 
demand requirement, the special litigation committee, the ownership of any 
17 Compare PacLink Commc 'ns, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438, 440 (explicitly applying direct 
harm rule for corporations to LLCs; holding plaintiff members who lost the value of their 
investments had no standing to bring a direct action against other members, who allegedly 
transferred the company's assets to other entities they owned without paying the plaintiffs or 
getting their permission, because the plaintiffs were not directly injured), with Jones, 460 P.2d at 
470 (holding the plaintiff's claims against other shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty could be 
brought individually because the "gravamen of her cause of action" was a direct injury to herself 
and other minority shareholders). See also Godfrey v. Lafavour, No. 105-005 CV JWS, 2005 WL 
2340714, at *4 (D. Alaska Sept. 12, 2005) (discussed supra note 9); Dawson, 551 S.E.2d at 877 
(discussed supra note 14). 
18 Compare Giuliano v. Pastina, 793 A.2d 1035, 1036-37 (R.I. 2002) (using the duty owed 
approach as an alternative to the direct harm approach and holding that the involvement of the 
defendant, an LLC employee, in an illegal telephone betting scheme damaged the company itself, 
not the plaintiff LLC member, and that the employee owed a duty only to the LLC, his employer, 
not to the plaintifl), with Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 50 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying Rhode 
Island law and explaining that if an injury results from a "violation of a duty owed directly to 
shareholders, they may sue on their own behalf'). 
19 For a theoretical approach to the distinction, see infra Part IV. 
2°Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 966 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under "standard choice oflaw 
rules ... the law of the state of incorporation determines who can bring a derivative suit"); see 
also Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 384 n.l (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that under the 
applicable state law "the determination of whether a plaintiff's claims are direct or derivative 
depends upon the law of the company's state of incorporation"); Bagdon v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "(t]he choice between 
derivative and direct litigation is a choice about how (and by whom) the internal affairs of the firm 
are managed"); Fleeger v. Clarkson Co. Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 388, 395 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (stating that 
"in a shareholder derivative suit the court must apply the law of the place of incorporation"); 
Kessler v. Sinclair, 641 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) ("The issue is one of corporate 
governance in the sense of locating who is to exercise control of the alleged corporate claim. In 
these circumstances, the law of Massachusetts and general law as well direct us to apply the law 
of the State of incorporation."). 
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amount recovered, and the availability vel non of attorneys' fees for a 
victorious plaintiff.21 
A. The Risk of Dismissal (Whose Claim Is It?) 
The most fundamental consequence for a plaintiff who mischaracterizes 
a derivative cause of action as direct is the risk of dismissal of the claim.22 
A derivative claim belongs to the entity, and an owner has no standing to 
bring the claim except on behalf of the entity.23 For example, Giuliano v. 
Pastina concerned a limited liability company involved in "harness racing 
and video simulcasting."24 A member of the LLC believed that "an agent 
and/or employee" of the LLC had damaged the business and the member's 
ownership interest through "involvement in illegal telephone betting."25 
The member sued directly (in his own right), rather than derivatively (on 
behalf of the company).26 The trial court dismissed, and the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court affirmed: "[P]laintiffs claims, if valid, belonged to the 
corporation [sic], and the plaintiffs complaint was in reality a derivative 
action that had not been filed in accordance with Rule 23.1 [the rule 
governing pleadings in a derivative action]."27 
21 There are other procedural ramifications, including the "contemporaneous ownership 
requirement." For an overview of these ramifications, see DEBORAH A. DEMOIT, SHAREHOLDER 
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.1, at 4-2 (2003). See also Daniel S. Kleinberger 
& !manta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or "What's a Lawsuit Between Friends in an 
'Incorporated Partnership?,'" 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1203, 1226--29 (1996). 
22 Marcoux v. Prim, 04 CVS 920, 2004 NCBC 5, at "iM]36--38 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004), 
available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2004%20NCBC%205.htm ("If this is a 
derivative action rather than a direct action, the plaintiff made three crucial mistakes as to the 
Complaint filed in this action ... [including not making] allegations with respect to demand 
futility required by Delaware law. If this is a derivative action, it is subject to dismissal."). 
23 In re Sagent Tech., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("A shareholder does 
not have standing to sue in an individual capacity for injury to the corporation."). 
24 793 A.2d 1035, 1036 (R.I. 2002). 
25 !d. 
26 /d. 
27 !d. at 1036-37. The court's incorrect reference to "corporation," and earlier in the opinion 
to "shareholder," reflects a continuing, albeit lessening, phenomenon of judicial confusion as to 
the nature of, and correct terminology for, limited liability companies. See I BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, '\ll.Ol[3][f1; Kleinberger, Soup, supra note 2, at 15 ("More than one 
court has referred to an LLC as 'a limited liability corporation' or to LLC members as 
shareholders, and one case referred to an LLC's members as 'limited liability partners."'). 
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In most circumstances, dismissal of a claim incorrectly pled as direct 
will be without prejudice, but even so the dismissal may be dispositive.28 A 
plaintiff may well decide to eschew amending the complaint, in light of the 
procedural barriers facing a derivative claim.29 If the language of the 
complaint itself eschews a derivative claim, the dismissal will be with 
prejudice. 30 
The distinction between a direct and derivative claim generally 
precludes a member's direct action to enforce a contract made by an LLC,31 
28 Cf Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that it was proper to deny the plaintiff leave to further amend the complaint to allege direct injury 
because plaintiff had already had three opportunities to do so); FS Parallel Fund L.P. v. Ergen, 
No. 19853, 2004 WL 3048751, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004) (holding that it was proper to 
dismiss with prejudice a count purporting to state a direct claim, "because StarBand [the 
corporation] is the injured party and because the recovery for that injury would accrue to 
StarBand, Count I states a derivative claim, and it therefore would be futile to permit the 
amendment [sought by shareholder plaintiffs in lieu of a dismissal with prejudice] because 
StarBand has released all claims against the defendants"). If the statute oflimitations has not run, 
a plaintiff whose direct claim has been dismissed should be able to file a derivative claim. Neither 
res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply because the real parties in interest are different. The 
direct claim belongs to and occasions adjudication of the rights of the plaintiff itself, while "in 
derivative litigation the substantive claim belongs to the corporation." DEMOTI, supra note 21, 
§ 4.99, at 4-243 to 4-242. Of course, to proceed derivatively the plaintiff must comply with the 
special procedural requirements for a derivative claim. See id. § 4.1; see also infra Part Ill. B. 
29 See infra Part III.B. 
30 Manzo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ.A. 18451-NC, 2002 WL 31926606, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
19, 2002) (stating that "[t]he breach of fiduciary duty claim against the director defendants is 
dismissed with prejudice because the amended complaint does not state a direct claim and 
disavows any derivative claim"). 
31 Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1092 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (holding, 
in a dispute between franchisees and their franchisor, that members of an LLC lacked standing to 
sue for damages allegedly suffered by the LLC as a franchisee). In one case, the LLC members 
asserted that they were not bound by a contract's arbitration provision because they were separate 
and distinct from the LLC and were not signatories to the contract. Beaver Constr. Co. v. 
Lakehouse, LLC, 742 So. 2d 159, 165 (Ala. 1999). The Court rejected that assertion: "[B]y 
arguing that they were not signatories to the Construction Contract between Beaver and 
Lakehouse, their corporation, they have conceded that they have no viable individual claims 
based on the transactions between Beaver and Lakehouse." !d. (footnote omitted); see also Maile 
v. Webster Bank, N.A., No. CV040527763, 2005 WL 590403, at *2-*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 
10, 2005) (holding that a sole member lacked standing to sue the bank for allowing an 
unauthorized withdrawal from the LLC's bank account); Ark Entm't, L.L.C. v. C.J. Gayfer & 
Co., Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-1929, 1999 WL 717631, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 1999) (dismissing 
individual claims by LLC members that they were harmed by the alleged breach of a lease 
agreement because only the LLC, not the members, were parties to the lease, but allowing the 
LLC's claims on the same matter to go forward). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Baylor L. Rev. 73 2006
2006] DIRECT VERSUS DERIVATIVE 73 
applies even when the limited liability company has only one member,32 
and is often pivotal in disputes between or among members of an LLC.33 
In re Tri-River Trading, LLC provides an interesting, if somewhat 
atypical, example of that pivotal role.34 The LLC was a river barge trading 
company composed of two members, a grain company that agreed to 
provide substantial business to the LLC and an individual who served as the 
LLC's manager. 35 A manager of the grain company made unsuccessful 
sexual advances toward the member-manager and then caused the grain 
company to withdraw its business from the LLC.36 The member-manager 
sued and obtained a settlement.37 In subsequent bankruptcy litigation, it 
became important to determine to what extent the settlement reflected 
claims of the LLC (that is, derivative claims) and to what extent claims of 
the LLC manager as an individual. 38 The bankruptcy appellate panel parsed 
the claims carefully, and held that, while the claims for breach of contract 
due to the withdrawal of the grain company's business belonged to the 
LLC,39 the counts relating to fraud in the inducement were individual 
32 E.g., Kogut v. Church Homes, Inc., No. CV000436717S, 2002 WL 31662388, at *4 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 06, 2002) (holding that the sole member of an LLC did not have standing to file a 
lawsuit for breach of a contract because the contract was between a nursing home and the LLC 
itself, not the member and dismissing the claim because the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction based on the member's lack of standing); Maile, 2005 WL 590403, at *2-*3 (holding 
that an LLC's sole member lacked standing to sue a bank for allowing an unauthorized withdrawal 
from the LLC's bank account). 
33 DEMOTT, supra note 21, § 2.1 ("It is often attractive to a shareholder as a prospective 
plaintiff to be able to assert a claim in an individual or direct action. Doing so avoids the 
complications associated with derivative litigation as a form of representative litigation, as well as 
requirements and doctrines specific to derivative litigation. Thus much turns on the determination 
whether the claim concerns an injury that is individual to the plaintiff or, instead, concerns an 
injury to the corporation, in which case the shareholder must bring a derivative suit."); see also 
Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc, 537 S.E.2d 248, 254 (2000) (observing that 
"derivative litigation is obviously more unwieldy and inspires more litigation of ancillary issues 
than an individual action by plaintiff minority shareholders"). 
34 329 B.R. 252, 267-70 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005). 
35 !d. at 257. 
36 !d. at 258. 
37 !d. at 258-59. 
38 !d. at 257, 267-68. 
39 !d. at 267 ("Because all contracts involved in these Counts were Tri-River's, and not 
DeBold's, Counts I, II, and V belonged to Tri-River . . . . DeBold could recover on these counts 
only derivatively as a member of the limited liability company which was the party with standing 
to assert them.") (citation omitted). The court also found these claims barred by a provision of the 
LLC's operating agreement. !d.; see also Albers v. Guthy-Renker Corp., 92 Fed. Appx. 497, 499 
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claims.40 The distinction was worth more than $400,000 to the former 
manager.41 
B. The Key Procedural Barriers 
In most member-to-member conflicts, the direct/derivative distinction 
plays out more simply. Depending on one's point of view, the typical 
structure involves: 
(i) a disgruntled minority member who objects to a 
majority member's legitimate exercise of management 
power, seeks a judicially enforced put right, and brings a 
direct claim in an effort to evade the procedural protections 
provided the LLC by the derivative pathway; or 
(ii) a conniving majority that despoils the LLC with the 
purpose and effect of injuring only the minority member, 
(9th Cir. 2004) ("[B]ecause members of Ad Choice [an LLC] ... hold no direct ownership interest 
in the company's assets, the members cannot be directly injured when the company is improperly 
deprived of those assets. Thus, in order for Appellants to bring a claim based on injuries allegedly 
suffered by Ad Choice, the suit must be brought derivatively. Consequently, the district court did 
not err when it dismissed claims Appellants brought in their individual capacities.") (citation 
omitted). 
40 According to the panel: 
The bankruptcy court held that DeBold [the LLC's member-manager] had not proven a 
case of misrepresentation based on sexual harassment, and therefore could not recover 
under Counts III and IV. But, that was not what DeBold was claiming. DeBold never 
asserted a sexual harassment claim. Her attorney so testified. While she alleged sexual 
harassment, and would use the sexual advances to establish background, her claim was 
for misrepresentation of the viability of the business based on Thornton's statements 
and his commitment that Jersey Grain intended to deal exclusively with Tri-River. 
Contrary to the bankruptcy court's holding, there was ample evidence in the record to 
suggest that Thornton intentionally provided information for the guidance of a limited 
group of persons to form Tri-River. The pro formas were in evidence and DeBold 
testified that she received them before entering into the transaction. Had she gone to 
trial, we believe, based on the record in this case, that she could have made a 
submissible case against the defendants on these two Counts, and therefore her claims 
had significant settlement value. 
/d. at 265 (footnotes omitted). 
41 /d. at 269-70. 
HeinOnline -- 58 Baylor L. Rev. 75 2006
2006] DIRECT VERSUS DERIVATIVE 
counting on the tribulations of the derivative pathway to 
deter, or at least delay, the minority's quest for justice.42 
75 
However characterized, the derivative pathway involves two major 
constraints: (I) the demand requirement and (2) the possibility of a special 
litigation committee. Both stand between the plaintiff and a judicial 
decision on the merits. Both reflect the fundamental notion that, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, those who manage a business entity should 
have control over all of the entity's important business decisions, including 
a decision as to whether, when, and how the entity should pursue 
litigation.43 
42 See Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41,46 (N.H. 2005) (explaining, in adopting a special rule 
allowing direct suits in certain circumstances for shareholders in close corporations, that the 
procedures required by a derivative lawsuit can be disastrous for the plaintiff: "[W]e also 
recognize that the derivative proceeding involves burdensome, and often futile, procedural 
requirements when a minority shareholder seeks to redress wrongful behavior by the majority 
shareholders."). 
43 Starrels v. First Nat'! Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring) ("The persuasive rationale for the demand requirement is that it allows directors to 
make a business decision about a business question: whether to invest the time and resources of 
the corporation in litigation."); Halpert Enters., Inc. v. Harrison, 362 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The demand rule is meant 'to give the derivative corporation itself the 
opportunity to take over a suit which was brought on its behalf in the first place, and thus to allow 
the directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conductors of the corporation's 
affairs."'); Kaufman v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (D. Kan. 1986) 
("Practically speaking, the demand requirement promotes a form of 'alternative dispute 
resolution' -that is, the corporate management may be in a better position to pursue alternative 
remedies, resolving grievances without burdensome and expensive litigation."); Werbowsky v. 
Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 133 (Md. 2001) ("As a general rule, the business and affairs of a 
corporation are managed under the direction of its board of directors .... Shareholders are not 
ordinarily permitted to interfere in the management of the company; they are the owners of the 
company but not its managers. Thus, any exercise of the corporate power to institute litigation 
and the control of any litigation to which the corporation becomes a party rests with the directors 
or, by delegation, the officers they appoint. ... The shareholder's derivative action was developed 
in the mid 19th Century as an extraordinary equitable device to enable shareholders to enforce a 
corporate right that the corporation failed to assert on its own behalf."); In re Pozen S'holders 
Litig., No. 04 CVS 1540, No. 04 CVS 1542, 2005 NCBC 7, at~ 82 n.4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Nov. 10, 
2005), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2005%20NCBC%207.htrn ("The 
demand requirement is premised on the idea that the decision of whether to bring a lawsuit is a 
business one that is properly in the hands of the corporation's directors, whose role it is to manage 
the business and affairs of the corporation."); Greene v. Shoemaker, No. 97-CVS-2118, 1998 WL 
34032497, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1998) ("The demand requirement reinforces the basic 
norms of corporate governance by protecting the ability of the directors to make a business 
judgment about what is in the best interest of the corporation and all of its shareholders."); see 
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C. The Demand Requirement 
The demand requirement establishes a prerequisite to the filing of a 
derivative claim. A would-be derivative plaintiff must either (i) first make 
demand on those in control of the entity, permitting them to consider 
whether to cause the entity to bring suit in its own name,44 or (ii) be able to 
plead facts to show that a demand would be futile.45 The current draft of 
also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1991) (holding that demand 
requirement is a matter of substantive law); Ishimaru v. Fung, No. Civ.A. 929, 2005 WL 
2899680, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2005) (noting, in a case involving an LLC, that the demand 
requirement is a matter of "substantive law"). The demand requirement is also intended to 
prevent or at least constrain "strike" suits. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 95-97 ("To prevent abuse of [the 
derivative] remedy ... equity courts established as a precondition 'for the suit' that the 
shareholder demonstrate that 'the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand, 
unless excused by extraordinary conditions."' (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 
(1970) (footnote omitted))). 
44 The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA), section II 03, provides: "In a 
derivative action for a limited liability company, the complaint must set forth with particularity the 
effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a member or manager or the reasons for 
not making the effort." UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT§ 1103 (rev. 2001), 6A U.L.A. 647 (2003); see 
also Allison ex rei Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. II 06, 1118 (D. Del. 
1985) (finding lawsuit filed two and a half months after the demand was premature because the 
"magnitude and complexity" of the issues was too great for the corporation's board of directors to 
adequately investigate them during that time), affd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985); McCann v. 
McCann, 61 P.3d 585, 588 (Idaho 2002) (dismissing a closely held corporation shareholder's 
derivative suit for failing to comply with the statutory requirement of waiting ninety days after 
delivering a written demand to the corporation before filing a lawsuit); Bartlett v. N.Y., N.H. & 
H.R. Co., 109 N.E. 452, 454 (Mass. 1915) (stating that a shareholder who makes a demand prior 
to filing a derivative lawsuit must wait "a reasonable time to afford the directors opportunity either 
to institute proceedings or to refuse to do so" and holding that filing the lawsuit one week after 
mailing letters to the directors was not sufficient). 
45 McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (dismissing an LLC member's 
claims of fraud and misrepresentation against other LLC members for allegedly withholding 
information from him, which detrimentally affected the way he managed the affairs of the LLC, 
because the wrong was to the LLC; holding the plaintiff had claimed derivative, not direct, harm, 
but had neglected to follow the procedures for bringing a derivative claim); see also 13 WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 5963 (permed., rev. vol. 2004 & Supp. 2005) (stating that making a demand that the corporation 
take the desired action is a requirement of filing a derivative lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.1, in most states (by statute or rules of civil procedure), and under the Model 
Business Corporation Acts). The American Law Institute has recommended that the futility 
exception be eliminated, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.03 ("Exhaustion of 
Intracorporate Remedies"), and a noteworthy Seventh Circuit concurrence muses in the same 
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the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (Re-ULLCA) 
provides that: 
A member may maintain a derivative action to enforce a 
right of a limited liability company if: 
( 1) the member first makes a demand on the other members 
in a member-managed limited liability company, or the 
managers of a manager-managed limited liability company, 
requesting that they cause the limited liability company to 
bring an action to enforce the right, and the managers or 
other members do not bring the action within a reasonable 
time; or 
direction, Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1176 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Easterbrook, J ., concurring). 
A few states have eliminated the futility exception. For example, North Carolina law 
provides: 
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: 
(I) A written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and 
(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made unless, prior to the 
expiration of the 90 days, the shareholder was notified that the corporation rejected the 
demand, or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the 
expiration of the 90-day period. 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-7-42 (2005). 
In most states, however, the traditional approach remains in place. Werbowsky, 766 A.2d at 
141 (stating that, as of 2001, "[a]t least 17 States have, by statute, adopted [a universal demand 
requirement under] the Model Business Corporation Act and one more, Florida, established a 
universal demand requirement in different language, [and that] [t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
adopted a number of sections of the [ALI] Principles, including § 7.03 [the universal demand 
requirement], by judicial decision") (footnotes omitted). 
Texas has adopted a universal demand requirement similar to that under the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA), but exempts derivative proceedings involving closely held corporations 
from the requirement. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.14, §§ C, L(I) (Vernon 2003) (applying 
until 20 I 0 to Texas corporations formed prior to January I, 2006); TEX. Bus. ORG. CODE ANN. 
§ 21.553, 21.563(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (applying to Texas corporations formed on or after 
January I, 2006 and to all Texas corporations, regardless of when formed, beginning January I, 
2010). The same approach is followed in the LLC context. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 
§§ C, L(I) (Vernon 2003) (applying until 2010 to Texas LLCs formed prior to January I, 2006 
pursuant to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. l528n, art. 8.12 (Vernon Supp. 2005)); TEX. BUS. 
ORG. CODE ANN. §§ 101.453, l01.463(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (applying to Texas LLCs formed 
on or after January 1, 2006 and to all Texas LLCs, regardless of when formed, beginning January 
1,2010). 
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(2) a demand would be futile.46 
Complying with the demand requirement involves delay and at least 
some additional cost, and most derivative claims assert demand futility. 
The requirements for pleading demand futility have been delineated most 
specifically by Delaware law,47 which has significantly influenced the law 
of other states.48 
Under Delaware law, to plead demand futility the derivative plaintiff 
must allege, without the benefit of discovery, "particularized facts [so that] 
a reasonable doubt is created that: ( 1) the directors are disinterested and 
independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of 
46 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REV. UNIF. LTD. 
LIAB. Co. ACT § 902 (Draft Annual Meeting 2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
ulc/ullca/2005annmtgdraft.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
47 The seminal Delaware case is a corporate case. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 
(Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
Delaware applies the Aronson standard across the entity board. Ishimaru v. Fung, No. Civ. A. 
929, 2005 WL 2899680, at *II (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2005) ("Delaware law rightly takes seriously 
the task of evaluating when a suit by an entity should proceed at the instance of a derivative 
plaintiff, rather than the entity's governing authority. That is why our corporate law imposes a 
specific burden to plead demand futility, and why that has been replicated in our statute 
addressing LLCs.") (footnote omitted); Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., CIV. A. No. 
12137, 1993 WL 5922, at *2-*6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 1993) (recognizing that the standard for 
showing demand futility in a derivative suit is identical for corporations and limited partnerships). 
48 See, e.g., Silver v. Allard, 16 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Aronson 
standard under Illinois law); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 989, 996--97 (W.D. Pa. 
1993) (same under Pennsylvania law); Blumenthal v. Teets, 745 P.2d 181, 185-86 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1987) (same under Arizona law); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Derivative Litig., 659 A.2d 961, 
970 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (same under New Jersey law). But see Haymond Napoli 
Diamond, P.C. v. Haymond, No. Civ.A. 02-721, 2005 WL 1840160, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2005) 
(stating, with regard to Pennsylvania law, '"Cuker, which established that a demand is excused 
only if irreparable harm to the corporation is shown, changed the law on demand requirements in 
derivative actions.' Demand is now excused if the shareholder shows irreparable injury to the 
corporation would otherwise result, and then demand should be made promptly after 
commencement of the action. If irreparable injury would not result, the court should dismiss a 
derivative action that is commenced before the response of the board to a demand unless the board 
does not respond within a reasonable time.") (citations omitted); Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 
A.2d 123, 143 (Md. 2001) ("Although, due to the respect properly accorded Delaware decisions 
on corporate law, the Delaware approach is often mentioned and the business judgment rule is 
generally regarded as applicable in a demand futility analysis, few, if any, States have abandoned 
their existing law in favor of that approach, and some of the criticism of it needs to be taken into 
account."). If the Delaware entity is a corporation, pre-suit investigation may be carried out 
through a shareholder demand to access corporate records. See infra note 51. 
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a valid exercise of business judgment."49 As recently explained by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery (in a case involving a limited liability 
company): 
Under the substantive law of Delaware, a court will 
find demand futility where "the particularized factual 
allegations of a derivative stockholder complaint create a 
reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, 
the board of directors could have properly exercised its 
independent and disinterested business judgment m 
responding to a demand. "50 
The allegations must be quite specific: 
Pleadings in derivative suits ... must comply with stringent 
requirements of factual particularity that differ substantially 
from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by 
[general rules of pleading. The derivative pleading 
requirement] is not satisfied by conclusory statements or 
mere notice pleading. On the other hand, the pleader is not 
required to plead evidence. What the pleader must set forth 
are particularized factual statements that are essential to the 
claim. Such facts are sometimes referred to as "ultimate 
facts," "principal facts" or "elemental facts." Nevertheless, 
the particularized factual statements that are required to 
comply with the [derivative suit] pleading rules must also 
comply with the mandate ... that they be "simple, concise 
and direct. "51 
49 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. The Aronson court mistakenly used the conjunction "and" 
rather than "or," but the latter is correct. See, e.g., VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2003 
WL 723285, at *II n.60 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2003) (replacing the "and" with "or"). 
50 Ishimaru, 2005 WL 2899680, at *12 (quoting Rates v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 
1993)). 
51 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (footnotes omitted); see Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589, 592 
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (applying the Brehm standard under Delaware law); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 
808, 815 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the Brehm standard under Delaware law). See generally 
13 FLETCHER, supra note 45, § 6003 (compiling pleading rules for derivative lawsuits). 
Delaware law has harsh consequences for the derivative plaintiff who fails to plead 
adequately demand futility- dismissal with prejudice. As explained recently by North Carolina's 
Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases: 
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The pleading requirement can be difficult or impossible to overcome 
when a majority of the entity's governing body is not involved in the 
alleged misconduct.52 In the closely-held context, however, the derivative 
[I]t is well-settled under Delaware law that, as a general rule, a plaintiff should not be 
afforded the opportunity to amend the complaint where he or she fails to properly plead 
demand futility .... [T]his rule is designed to encourage plaintiffs to investigate their 
claims before filing a complaint so that they have a basis at the outset to make 
particularized factual allegations in the complaint" .... Therefore, the Amended 
Complaint [in this case] must be dismissed with prejudice. 
The Court notes that it was within the plaintiffs' powers as ... shareholders to avail 
themselves of information that may have allowed them to plead facts with sufficient 
particularity to survive the defendants' motion. While not entitled to discovery in order 
to prove demand futility, had plaintiffs brought a motion under Section 220 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law seeking inspection of [the corporation's] books and 
records, they may have discovered facts that would have allowed them to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the directors' disinterest and independence. While stopping 
short of requiring plaintiffs to conduct an inspection of the corporation's books and 
records before commencing a derivative action, Delaware courts have offered strong 
words for plaintiffs who, after failing to do so and filing inadequate pleadings, cause 
substantial cost to the parties and the judiciary .... Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 981 
(Del. Ch. September 30, 2003) ([noted] that "it is troubling to this Court that, 
notwithstanding repeated suggestions, encouragement, and downright admonitions over 
the years both by this Court and by the Delaware Supreme Court, litigants continue to 
bring derivative complaints pleading demand futility on the basis of precious little 
investigation beyond perusal of the morning newspapers"). 
In re Pozen S'holders Litig., No. 04 CVS 1540, No. 04 CVS 1542, 2005 NCBC 7, at~ 82 n.4 
(N.C. Bus. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005) (most internal quotations and citations omitted), available at 
http://www .ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2005%20NCBC%207 .htm. 
52 Possibly the most famous example is Grabow v. Perot, a case in which the court held that 
the plaintiff shareholders had failed to establish demand futility despite the plaintiffs' allegations 
that the corporation's board of directors was not disinterested or independent when it agreed to an 
improperly favorable buy-out of one director's interest, purportedly to silence the director's 
criticisms of the corporation's management. 526 A.2d 914, 919, 925 (Del. Ch. 1987); see VGS, 
Inc., 2003 WL 723285, at *II (stating, in a derivative case involving an LLC with a three-person 
board of managers, that "[b ]oth the Cas tiel Parties and the Sahagen Parties concede that the sole 
issue relating to whether demand on the Virtual Geo board would have been futile depends on 
whether Ambassador (Ret.) Gerald Helman would be disinterested and independent in a demand 
made by Sahagen to pursue litigation against Castiel for breach of fiduciary duty ... because 
Castiel and Sahagen are the other two members of Virtual Geo's three-person Board of 
Managers"). 
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plaintiff typically names as defendants all those with the power to control 
the entity. In such circumstances, demand futility is essentially a given.53 
D. The Special Litigation Committee 
Regardless of whether demand is required or excused, in a derivative 
suit the entity can, and typically does, insert a special litigation committee 
(SLC) into the process. 54 An SLC is a committee selected by an entity's top 
managers to act in their place to investigate the alleged misconduct and 
make a business judgment as to the entity's position on the litigation. 55 An 
SLC can be appointed pre-suit (in response to a demand) or after a 
derivative suit has begun. 56 Once a court has jurisdiction over the matter, 
the SLC (or the entity) can move for an order (i) staying discovery pending 
the SLC's investigation,57 (ii) dismissing the suit as in the best interests of 
53 Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260 (D. Kan. 2000) ("[T]he 
facts alleged throughout the complaint make it clear that it would have been futile for the Carson 
Trust [derivative plaintiff in a case involving an LLC] to make a demand of the board of 
managers. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that subsequent to Lynch Multimedia filing a 
lawsuit against Carson Communications, the Carson Trust had no influence over or input into the 
decisions of the board and that Lynch Multimedia deliberately oppressed the Carson Trust. The 
Carson Trust, therefore, did not need to make a demand of the board Of managers before filing this 
lawsuit."); Ishimaru, 2005 WL 2899680, at *12 (stating that "the amended complaint pleads 
particularized facts demonstrating that Fung, as managing member [who controls a majority of the 
membership interests], cannot disinterestedly determine whether Paradigm [the LLC] should sue 
Ivy Asset [a third party allegedly involved in misconduct with the managing member]"); Vertical 
Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ross Sys., Inc., 784 N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 (App. Div. 2004) (recognizing 
demand futility where the operating agreement required a 70% vote of membership interests to 
authorize a suit and a member holding a thirty-five percent interest improperly refused to agree to 
the suit). 
In Texas, demand is excused by statute in the closely held LLC context. TEX. Bus. CORP. 
ACT. ANN. art. 5.14 § L (Vernon 2003) (applying to LLCs under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 
1528n, art. 8.12 (Vernon Supp. 2005)); TEX. BUS. 0RG. CODE ANN. § 101.463(a) (Vernon Supp. 
2005). 
54 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffiey P. Miller, The Plaintiffi' Attorney's Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. I, 38 (1991). 
55 Grover C. Brown et a!., Director and Advisor Disinterestedness and Independence Under 
Delaware Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1157, 1188 (1998). 
56 James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A 
Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959,961 n.9 (1982). 
57 See Allan M. Terrell, Jr. & Samuel A. Nolen, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate 
Law, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 409 (1983) (discussing Pompeo v. Hefner, Civ. A. Nos. 6806, 6872, 
1983 WL 20284 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1983), in which the court granted a stay of discovery pending 
HeinOnline -- 58 Baylor L. Rev. 82 2006
82 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1 
the entity (with or without some settlement with the defendants),58 or (iii) 
allowing the SLC to take control of the lawsuit and prosecute on behalf of 
the entity. 
SLCs are controversial. Depending on the observer's point of view, the 
SLC mechanism is either: 
(i) an instrument of the devil employed to: 
(a) stack the deck in favor of management, and 
(b) frustrate legitimate claims of mismanagement or 
oppresswn; or 
(ii) a respectable and useful form of alternate dispute 
resolution, necessary to prevent diabolic agents (i.e., the 
plaintiffs' bar) from using litigation to: 
(a) reset the agreed-upon deal, 
(b) shift management control from the majority to a 
dissident who does not like the business strategy 
chosen by the majority, and thereby 
(c) frustrate the legitimate right of "selfish 
ownership,"59 (i.e., the right of the majority to run the 
business). 
the decision of a special litigation committee about the action); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§§ 7.43-
7.44 (2002) (addressing stay of proceedings and dismissal). 
Texas has adopted SLC stay and dismissal provisions similar to the MBCA but exempts 
proceedings involving closely held corporations and closely held LLCs from these provisions. 
TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 §§ D, F-H, L( I) (Vernon 2003); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 1528n, art. 8.12A (Vernon Supp. 2005); TEX. Bus. ORG. CODE §§ 21.554-
21.556, 21.558, 21.563(b), 101.454-101.456, 101.458, 101.463(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005). 
58 Brown et al., supra note 55, at 1188; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 7.44, 7.45 (2002) 
(discussing dismissal and discontinuance or settlement respectively); see, e.g., Thompson v. 
Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion in 
trial court's dismissal of a derivative suit, "where the over 900-page report of the SLC reflected a 
detailed and documented investigation, including the backgrounds and qualifications of its 
members[, and the plaintiff, h]aving received a copy of the report ... failed to initiate any 
discovery ... in an effort to show that the SLC did not make a determination in good faith after 
conducting a reasonable investigation"). 
59 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (holding that, 
in a closely held corporation, unlimited shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duties "will result in 
the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close corporation 
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Even the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the dangers of 
structural bias in SLCs: 
[W]e must be mindful that directors [appointed to the 
special litigation committee] are passing judgment on 
fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow 
directors, in this instance, who designated them to serve 
both as directors and committee members. The question 
naturally arises whether a 'there but for the grace of God go 
I' empathy might not play a role. And the further question 
arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and 
reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against 
abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.60 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has expressed similar 
concerns,61 as has the Iowa Supreme Court.62 Moreover, there are a few 
which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interests of all 
concerned" and noting that "[t]he majority, concededly, have certain rights to what has been 
termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation which should be balanced against the concept of 
their fiduciary obligation to the minority"). 
60 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
61 Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 55 (Mass. 1990) (explaining that reviewing the special 
litigation committee only for the adequacy of its investigation and independence of its members 
may "not realistically deal with the danger of structural bias in the special litigation committee 
device"). 
62 Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983) (noting 
that commentators have expressed concerns about the potential in SLCs for structural bias and 
stating that "it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent committees are free from 
personal, financial or moral influences which flow from the directors who appoint them," 
particularly in cases where the members of the committee also are directors); see also Cox, supra 
note 56, 959-60, 1008 (calling the SLC the "latest threat" to the derivative suit, which, "[!]ike the 
heroine in a Saturday matinee, ... has repeatedly appeared to be at the cliffs of disaster;" arguing 
that to combat "structural bias" inherent in the SLC's being chosen by the corporation's board, "a 
court should use its own independent judgment to determine whether dismissal would be in the 
corporation's best interests"); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 84-85, 89, 100 (arguing that non-defendant board members' 
decisions about derivative lawsuits are affected by factors including directors' fears of their own 
personal liability, their belief that derivative suits usually deliver negligible benefits to the 
corporation while enriching the plaintiff's lawyers, social connections between defendants and 
remaining directors, and the favorable bias people generally have for members of groups to which 
they belong; concluding that these psychological factors "can be expected to generate subtle, but 
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cases that uphold an SLC decision even though, from the reported facts, the 
decision seems questionable. For example, in Marcuccilli v. Ken Corp., the 
court followed an SLC's recommendation that derivative claims be 
dismissed, even though the SLC had determined that the majority 
shareholders in two related close corporations had breached fiduciary 
duties. 63 The amount in controversy was at least $500,000, and the 
derivative plaintiff, a minority shareholder, alleged that the majority 
shareholders had taken personal loans at below-market interest rates from 
one corporation and had failed to disclose the true terms of an agreement 
that sold a parcel of land belonging to another corporation.64 In 
Abramowitz v. Posner, the court approved an audit committee's 
recommendation that the corporation not pursue a lawsuit if the directors 
reimbursed some $1 million in funds they had allegedly misappropriated, 
even though the committee acknowledged the corporation might recover 
more in litigation. 65 
On the other hand, the Delaware Supreme Court has praised the SLC as 
a form of ADR: "by requiring exhaustion of intracorporate remedies, the 
demand requirement invokes a species of alternative dispute resolution 
procedure which might avoid litigation altogether."66 The SLC is also an 
entity's best (albeit still costly) protection against strike suits and an 
powerful, biases which result in the independent directors' reaching a decision insulating 
colleagues on the board from legal sanctions"). 
63 766 N.E.2d 444,453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
64 /d. at 446-47. The plaintiffs also brought direct claims, which the court dismissed because 
the minority shareholders did not allege "a breach of a duty owed especially to the 
minority ... shareholders, separate and distinct from the duties owed to [the corporation] .... " 
/d. at 451. 
65 See 513 F. Supp. 120, 123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Cox, 
supra note 56, at 980--81 (describing the Abramowitz decision as displaying "a marked bias 
toward the defendants" and stating that the committee members "rationalized their generosity" by 
explaining that the defendant directors had otherwise "greatly benefited the corporation" and that 
procedures to prevent a reoccurrence of such behavior had been implemented). 
66 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000) (citing Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 
1216--17 (Del. 1996)); see Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 21, at 1235 ("[S]peciallitigation 
committees are a form of alternative dispute resolution. They sift facts and make 
recommendations in the shadow or context of litigation proceedings, but they do not directly 
consume court resources and are not laden with all the procedural paraphernalia of litigation."); 
see also Kaufman v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (D. Kan. 1986) ("Practically 
speaking, the demand requirement promotes a form of 'alternative dispute resolution'-that is, the 
corporate management may be in a better position to pursue alternative remedies, resolving 
grievances without burdensome and expensive litigation."). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Baylor L. Rev. 85 2006
2006] DIRECT VERSUS DERIVATIVE 85 
important bulwark against attempts to use litigation to "re-make" a 
previously agreed upon deal or allocation ofpower.67 
On the "re-make the deal" argument, a Massachusetts trial court opinion 
is instructive. In Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., the court 
considered a derivative lawsuit brought by a minority shareholder in a close 
corporation.68 The plaintiff alleged that the other shareholders had 
mismanaged the business, and in the abstract the claims seemed attractive.69 
The plaintiff accused the defendants of paying themselves excessive 
compensation, needlessly spending money to open another office, moving 
the corporation's offices, and unjustifiably increasing employee benefits.70 
However, the court determined that the suit was without merit because the 
decisions were "appropriate business judgments" and, therefore, properly 
within the defendants' discretion.71 
67 Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 645 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that 
SLCs are an important way for corporations to avoid "meritless or harmful litigation"); 
Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d I, 14 n.l6 (S.D. 1997) ("Those who operate and manage these 
[small, corporate] farms and businesses, often the majority shareholders, should not be subject to 
the demands of minority shareholders whose concern may be solely that of dividends and not the 
farm or business itself. Many of these small corporations and their management are ill-prepared 
to invest the time and money required to fend off a minority shareholder suit and are therefore 
influenced by the mere threat of such litigation."). The case did not involve an SLC, but the strike 
suit issue led the court to reject the ALI exception to the direct/derivative distinction in close 
corporations. See id. at 13-14 (noting defendants' argument that a direct lawsuit could be abused 
by a disgruntled minority shareholder in a close corporation). The ALI rule is discussed infra 
notes 175-183. 
68 No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *1-*6, (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002). 
69 /d. at *5. 
70 See id. at *5-*6. 
71 See id. at *1 0. The case did not involve an SLC but nonetheless illustrates the problem of 
using litigation to reset an agreed upon allocation of power. See also Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., 
lnc., 516 A.2d 132, 134-37 (Vt. 1986) (holding that the sale of a close corporation's assets to a 
major shareholder for one dollar in exchange for the shareholder's assumption of the corporation's 
debts was a legitimate business decision in light of the corporation's financial situation, and thus 
that the sale did not amount to a breach of fiduciary duties to minority shareholders); cf 
Kaufman, 634 F. Supp. at 1577 ("Practically speaking, the demand requirement promotes a form 
of 'alternative dispute resolution'-that is, the corporate management may be in a better position 
to pursue alternative remedies, resolving grievances without burdensome and expensive 
litigation."); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (recognizing that unbridled access to litigation by 
minority owners "will result in the imposition oflirnitations on legitimate action by the controlling 
group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the 
corporation in the best interests of all concerned."). 
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E. Proceeds and Attorneys' Fees 
The fourth and fifth practical ramifications concern the results of a 
lawsuit. From this perspective, plaintiffs in closely-held entities much 
prefer direct claims. If the claim is direct, the recovery is due directly to the 
plaintiff,72 and except in unusual circumstances the plaintiff must pay its 
own attorneys' fees and litigation expenses.73 If the claim is derivative, 
except in extraordinary circumstances, the proceeds belong to the entity, 74 
and the plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and other expenses.75 
72 See Oakland Raiders v. Nat' I Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005); Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988); Spillyards v. Abboud, 662 
N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The 
Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1785 (2004); Amanda 
M. Rose, Life After SLUSA: What is the Fate of Holding Claims? 69 DEF. COUNS. ]. 455, 464 
(2002). Some courts have noted this point as part of their analysis for making the direct/derivative 
distinction. See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
73 See Trieweiler v. Sears, 689 N. W.2d 807, 838, 846 (2004) (holding that "in the case of a 
closely held corporation, a court in its discretion may permit an individual recovery to the plaintiff 
in an action raising derivative claims, if it finds that to do so will not unfairly expose the 
corporation or defendants to a multiplicity of actions, materially prejudice the interests of creditors 
of the corporation, or interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested 
persons"; noting that, as a consequence of the plaintiff's individual recovery, the plaintiff is not 
entitled to attorneys' fees "because ... there is no evidence to suggest that this action resulted in 
the 'substantial benefit to the corporation' [as] contemplated by the statute" permitting attorney's 
fees in derivative actions) (citations omitted). 
74 If the normal derivative remedy will reward owners who were the malefactors, courts 
sometimes order that the recovery be made directly to the plaintiffs. E.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 
219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that minority shareholders should each recover an 
individual share of the premium wrongfully obtained by a controlling shareholder who, during a 
steel shortage, sold his shares in a steel corporation (and with these shares the power to control 
product distribution) to a buying group composed of steel users; noting that giving the corporation 
the recovery would benefit the new controlling shareholders). See generally DEMOTT, supra note 
21, § 7:6, at 7-45 (explaining that courts have sometimes "depart[ed] from the conventional rule 
that only the corporation may benefit from a judgment in a derivative suit and [ordered] instead 
that damages be paid directly to certain of the corporation's shareholders"). 
75 E.g., UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 1005(a)(1), (b) (rev. 2001), 6A U.L.A. 103-04 (2003) 
(providing that "any proceeds or other benefits of a derivative action ... belong to the limited 
partnership and not to the derivative plaintiff'' but stating that "[i]f a derivative action is successful 
in whole or in part, the court may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, from the recovery of the limited partnership"); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 1104 
(rev. 1996), 6A U.L.A. 647 (2003) (providing that "[i]f a derivative action for a limited liability 
company is successful, in whole or in part ... the court may award the plaintiff reasonable 
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, and shall direct the plaintiff to remit to the limited 
liability company the remainder of the proceeds received"); see, e.g., In re Cendant Corp., 232 F. 
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The case of Wilderman v. Wilderman provides a "Catch-22" illustration 
of the proceeds distinction.76 A divorce ended the Wilderman marriage but 
left the ex-spouses as the only shareholders in a corporation controlled by 
Mr. Wilderman.77 Mrs. Wilderman brought a successful derivative claim 
alleging that her ex-husband had received excessive compensation, and the 
court ordered the excess returned to the corporation.78 However, the court 
rejected Mrs. Wilderman's request that the returned funds be paid out as 
dividends.79 Mrs. Wilderman had no recovery, although her attorneys' fees 
were paid. 80 
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL FUNDAMENTALS FOR MAKING THE 
DISTINCTION (WITHOUT REGARD TO CLOSELY HELD CHARACTER) 
As explained in Part I, when courts address the direct/derivative 
distinction in the context of limited liability companies, the courts typically 
Supp. 2d 327, 337 n.l (D.N.J. 2002) ("Common-fund cases allow a person who maintains a 
lawsuit that results in the creation, preservation, or increase of a fund in which others have a 
common interest[] to be reimbursed from that fund for litigation expenses incurred. It is true that, 
strictly speaking, a shareholder derivative action is not a typical 'common fund' case, because the 
award is collected by the derivative plaintiff on behalf of the corporation, the true party in interest. 
However, [it has been] recognized that plaintiffs in a derivative action may recover attorneys' fees 
from the award obtained through prosecuting the case as in a more traditional common-fund suit, 
i.e. a class action") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Ferko v. Nat' I Ass'n For Stock Car 
Auto Racing, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 403, 406 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (explaining that the plaintiff and the 
corporation in a derivative lawsuit had similar interests because, if the plaintiff won, the plaintiff 
would receive attorneys' fees and the corporation would receive damages); DRW Builders, Inc. v. 
Richardson, 679 N .E.2d 902, 908-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that "all relief obtained in a 
derivative action belongs to the corporation" and that "a shareholder has the right to recover 
attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation in a shareholder derivative action."); DEMOTI, supra 
note 21, § 2:2, at 2-3 to 2-4. But see Gowin v. Granite Depot, L.L.C., No. 22828, 66 Va. Cir. 385, 
2005 WL 280957, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb 7, 2005) (ruling that a member had "standing to initiate 
a derivative action on behalf of Granite Depot against the Manager for a breach of fiduciary duty" 
but then stating that: "The business of the company can be efficiently and effectively carried on 
with Mr. Stathis [the derivative defendant] as Manager, after an accounting has been conducted 
and the interests of the parties determined. Accordingly, the Court will direct that an accounting 
be made between the members to establish their interests in and obligations to the limited liability 
company, including costs and reasonable attorney's fees that may be owed as a result of the 
instant litigation."). 
76 See generally 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
77 See id. at 613-14. 
78 !d. at 616. 
79 !d. 
80 See id. 
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turn to the law of corporations for guidance. The corporate case law 
contains two major, discordant approaches to the direct/derivative 
distinction: the direct harm approach and the special injury approach. 
There is also a third line of cases-involving the "duty owed" or "whose 
rights infringed" approach-which sometimes produces the correct results, 
but, at least as often, produces confused and confusing opinions. 81 
A. The Direct Harm Approach 
The direct harm approach is simple. It asks: who got hurt first-the 
entity or its owner(s)? "An individual cause of action exists only if 
damages to the shareholders were not incidental to damages to the 
corporation."82 Therefore, "the inquiry should focus on whether an injury is 
suffered by the shareholder that is not dependent on a prior injury to the 
corporation. "83 
81 See Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 21, 1249-50 (explaining direct harm and special 
injury rules). G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 234-35, 237 (Ind. 2001) (rejecting 
both the direct harm and special injury approaches; holding that the proper inquiry is whose rights 
the shareholder is asserting). A few decisions appear to adopt two approaches in the alternative. 
E.g., In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 322 B.R. 509, 526 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Where, 
however, the third-party's wrong inflicts an injury on stockholder's rights rather than on the 
corporation, the stockholder may seek direct relief in its own favor against the third-party. This 
can occur in two situations: where the allegedly wrongful conduct violates a separate duty to the 
complaining shareholder independent of the fiduciary duties that the wrongdoer owes to all of the 
shareholders, or where the conduct causes an injury to the plaintiff distinct from any injury to the 
corporation." (quoting In re Granite Partners, 194 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations 
and emphasis omitted)); Grace Bros. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 814, 817 (Ga. 1994) 
(holding that plaintiff shareholders who sought specific performance or damages for the breach of 
a merger agreement could not bring direct claims because they met neither the direct harm nor the 
special injury standard since their claims were "founded upon injuries which are no different from 
that suffered by the corporation or the other shareholders"). As shown infra Part IV.B, any 
situation that satisfies the special injury rule will also satisfY the direct harm rule, but not vice 
versa. 
82 Schuster v. Gardner, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 474-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that, under 
California law, the plaintiff shareholder's attempted class action lawsuit against officers and 
directors of a corporation for breaching fiduciary duties by overstating revenues, understating 
expenses and issuing stock to pay "for an ill-conceived acquisition spree," all of which led to a 
loss in shareholders' stock value, would be a derivative lawsuit because the harm to shareholders 
was "incidental" to the corporation's injury). 
83 Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1115, 1122, 1127 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that the 
plaintiff shareholders whose shares were eliminated without consideration in bankruptcy court had 
only derivative claims against fellow shareholders, who were also associated with entities that 
were creditors of the corporation in question, and who received new shares in the corporation in 
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Under the direct harm approach, mismanagement by the entity's 
managers gives rise to only a derivative claim because the owners' loss in 
value-no matter how real and substantial-is a consequence of a prior 
injury to the entity.84 In contrast, if a manager fraudulently induces a 
person to become an owner (or to increase or decrease the person's 
ownership interest),85 the resulting claim is direct. 86 The injury is to the 
owner; if anything, the entity will have benefited from the fraud. 87 
exchange for the cancellation of the promissory notes and stating that any alleged injury-losses 
from mismanagement or the inadequate payment for the new stock issued-stemmed from 
injuries suffered by the corporation) (emphasis added); see also Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., 
Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 906 (lith Cir. 1998) ("The difference is that a 
shareholder's derivative suit is for the benefit of the corporation and alleges an injury that befalls 
the corporation directly, instead of an injury to the nominal plaintiff who institutes the suit. The 
cause of action arises in the corporation itself, rather than in the nominal plaintiff who brings 
suit .... "). 
84 E.g., Bio-Thrust, Inc. v. Div. of Corps., 80 P.3d 164, 165--{)7 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that the plaintiff shareholder and president had no standing to protest the corporation's involuntary 
dissolution by the state ten years previously for allegedly failing to file an annual report after due 
notice because the plaintiff "simply complains of an injury that was direct to Bio-Thrust [the 
plaintiff corporation] as a corporation, with any damage that impacted him as a stockholder 
merely occurring as an indirect byproduct of that corporate harm;" also holding the corporation 
could not protest its dissolution because legally it had not existed for a decade); see also 
Agostino, 845 A.2d at 1115, 1122, 1127; Schuster, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75. 
85See, e.g., Sutter v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 170 P.2d 898, 901 (Cal. 1946) (concluding that 
the plaintiffs could state a direct claim where plaintiffs formed and invested in an oil development 
corporation based on the fraudulent inducement of defendants who previously owned the oil lease 
and drilling equipment the new corporation purchased; explaining that, even though the majority 
of the plaintiffs' losses arose from the loss in value of their shares in the corporation, the claim 
was direct because the defendants' representations were made directly to a plaintiff before the 
existence of the corporation and those representations induced him to form and invest in the 
corporation that was the instrument of the plaintiffs' losses); Sautter v. Fulmer, 179 N.E. 310, 
311-312 (N.Y. 1932) (holding that minority shareholders could get a judgment against majority 
shareholders who fraudulently induced the minority shareholders to sell their stock for less than 
one-third the price the majority shareholders received from the same purchaser); Vierling v. 
Baxter, 141 A. 728, 729 (Pa. 1928) (holding that a plaintiff shareholder could state a direct cause 
of action against corporate officers who fraudulently induced the plaintiff to give up his 
controlling shares and then sold the corporation's assets to one of the officers at a greatly reduced 
price in order to squeeze out the plaintiff completely because "the gravamen of plaintiff's 
complaint is not damage to the corporation or to stockholders in general, but to himself 
individually"). 
86 ATT Sys. Co. v. Tylman, No. 03 C 50326, 2004 WL 2674278, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 
2004) (stating that plaintiffs' claims were not based on the loss of value of their investment, 
"which would make the Plaintiffs' damages an indirect result of injury to the corporation," but 
instead were based on the defendants' wrongful inducement of the plaintiffs' investment in the 
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Claims that management has sold out too cheaply in a merger are also 
examples of direct claims. Even assuming actionable mismanagement, the 
entity has suffered no injury.88 The consideration runs to the owners, not 
the entity, so any consideration "left on the table" would not have benefited 
the entity. The harm, therefore, is not only first, but also exclusively, to the 
owners. 89 
corporation in the first place, which were "direct and distinct injuries to [the plaintiffs] as 
investors"); Vierling, 141 A. at 729; see also Solutia Inc. v. FMC Corp., 385 F. Supp. 2d 324, 
333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an allegation by one LLC member that other member had 
fraudulently induced its investment in the LLC was a direct claim because the member's injury 
was "independent of the corporate entity" and rejecting defendant member's argument that the 
harm was derivative because it was merely a reduction in its investment, an injury that would not 
be any different from that suffered by any other shareholder). 
87 The entity will have benefited if it, rather than another owner, was the other party to the 
transaction. It is possible to distinguish some of the fraud-in-the-inducement cases as involving 
plaintiffs in their pre-owner capacity. That is, the suit arises from a fraud occurring between the 
entity and a potential investor, before the investor becomes an owner. This distinction does not 
apply, however, to a claim that an existing owner has been fraudulently induced to increase or sell 
out an existing stake in the venture. 
88 Such claims can conveniently be labeled Rev/on claims, after Rev/on, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985), the seminal Delaware Supreme Court 
case holding that, when the sale of a corporation becomes inevitable, the directors owe the 
shareholders a duty to use reasonable efforts to maximize the sale value. 
89 Higgins v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., No. 601646/2005,2005 WL 2140168, at *5, *10 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Sept. 2, 2005) (holding that plaintiff seatholders could bring a class action lawsuit against 
the corporation's CEO and board members on their claims that they would receive inadequate 
compensation under a proposed merger agreement because the seatholders' equity interests in the 
corporation would be harmed by the merger agreement, while the corporation would be benefited 
by retaining more of its own equity and bringing that equity into the newly merged entity). At one 
point, this issue was in doubt under Delaware Jaw: 
The primary reason [being] that ... most plaintiffs in Delaware file a derivative action 
to challenge the fulfillment of Rev/on duties. Delaware courts usually excuse demand 
when Rev/on complaints are properly pled. As a result, Delaware courts have not had 
the opportunity to tackle the issue of whether or not plaintiffs can file these claims as a 
direct action. 
Marcoux v. Prim, 04 CVS 920, 2004 NCBC 5, at~ 45 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2004%20NCBC%205.htm. But see Parnes v. Bally 
Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Del. 1999) (explaining that stockholders may sue directly for 
injuries "that are independent of any injury to the corporation" and concluding that a shareholder 
could bring a direct class action claim alleging shareholders had received unfair payments for their 
interests from a merger under which the corporation's CEO demanded he be given large sums of 
money and certain corporate assets). For a succinct and thoughtful review of Delaware precedent 
in this area, see Marcoux, 2004 NCBC ~~ 41-60 ("[T]he focus of the Supreme Court in Tooley [v. 
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Any other conclusion would produce absurd results. Consider the 
following example: 
Entity A agrees to be merged into Entity B. The managers 
of Entity A are grossly negligent in their "due diligence" 
and negotiating tactics and agree to a price far below any 
reasonably "fair" level. The gross negligence comes to 
light only after the merger has become effective. If the 
claims are derivative, they have transferred by operation of 
law to Entity B, the surviving entity which was benefited 
rather than harmed by the breach of the duty of care 
committed by the managers of Entity A.90 
Besides avoiding absurd results, the direct injury approach also makes 
conceptual sense. The direct/derivative distinction is a question of 
standing, and standing is a matter of injury.91 The role of injury in standing 
is doctrinally fundamental, whether the context is the loftiest constitutional 
matters or prosaic questions of"good fences make good neighbors."92 
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that: 
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party 
who invokes the [federal] court's authority to show that he 
Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004),] on the 'injury' involved 
leads to the conclusion that a plaintiff may bring a pure Rev/on claim as a direct claim. The 
'injury' results from the diminished value that a shareholder would receive from a merger process 
that prevents the shareholders from achieving the highest value for their shares in a change of 
control merger. The treasury of the shareholder is depleted, not the treasury of the corporation."). 
The situation is arguably different when the merger-related claim is against a third party for 
somehow affecting the price the entity achieves by merging itself with another entity. See Nauslar 
v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.) (holding 
that plaintiffs (Nauslar Investments, LLC, the limited partner in a partnership and the limited 
partner in that partnership's general partner, and Nausler, sole member and owner of Nauslar 
Investments, LLC) had no standing to contest whether defendants unreasonably disapproved a 
proposed merger of the partnership with another entity; stating that the partnership suffered the 
direct injury-harm to its value-and loss to the plaintiffs from its lower sale price was derivative 
of the partnership's right of action for withholding approval). 
90 As will be discussed shortly, almost equally absurd results actually do occur under the 
special injury approach to the direct/derivative distinction. 
91 E.g., Conn. State Med. Soc'y v. Oxford Health Plans (CT), Inc., 863 A.2d 645, 652 (Conn. 
2005) (explaining standing and using variations of the words "harm" and "injury" each three times 
within a 100-word passage). 
92 ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON 12 (H. Holt & Co. 1915). 
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personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as 
a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, 
and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged 
action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision. 93 
The Utah Supreme Court has characterized "the traditional standing 
test" as a question of whether the plaintiff has suffered "legal injury,"94 and 
the Texas Supreme Court has stated: "As a general rule of Texas law, to 
have standing, ... a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she possesses an 
interest in a conflict distinct from that of the general public, such that the 
defendant's actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury."95 
In a "good fences/good neighbors" decision, the Maine Supreme Court 
used a "particularized injury" test to determine whether landowners had 
standing to challenge the Phippsburg Board of Appeal's decision to permit 
the building of a home adjacent to the plaintiffs' properties.96 The court 
held that standing existed because the "proposed construction may displace 
water and redirect it onto abutting properties. "97 
93 Valley Forge Christian Coli. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 
464, 472 (1982) (citations and internal quotations omitted); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 2.3.2, at 61 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that requiring an injury ensures the parties 
have an actual dispute and are not simply asking for an advisory opinion, preserves scarce judicial 
resources for "remedying concrete injuries," and gives the plaintiff "an incentive to vigorously 
litigate and present the matter to the court in the manner best suited for judicial resolution"); see 
also Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (lOth Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that a plaintiff has standing to sue if he has suffered an "injury in fact"-a "concrete 
and certain harm" that can be redressed by relief the court can grant; holding that the NCAA could 
sue on behalf of its members to challenge Health, Education and Welfare Department regulations 
affecting intercollegiate sports programs); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (summing up Supreme Court doctrine on standing by explaining that the plaintiff must 
allege "a distinct and palpable injury to himself," amounting to "a claim of specific present 
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm;" holding the plaintiff, a member of Congress, 
did not present any concrete injury to himself even assuming his claim of illegal CIA activity was 
true) (citations omitted). 
94 Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 89 P.3d 171, 174 (Utah 2004) ("Having 
suffered no legal injury, [the plaintiff] has no standing under the traditional standing test."). 
95 Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001). 
96 Norris Family Assoc., LLC v. Town ofPhippsburg, 879 A.2d 1007, 1012 (Me. 2005). 
97 /d. at 1010, I 013-14 (Me. 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue both the 
Government and the would-be home builder). "The issue of standing focuses upon whether the 
complaining party is the proper one to invoke the court's power. As such, to establish standing, a 
party must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and that the injury is a 
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In sum, under the direct harm approach: 
(i) if the owner's injury occurs only through the medium of 
some injury first suffered by the entity, then the owner's 
claim is indirect-that is, derivative of the entity's injury-
and the owner has no standing to bring a direct action; but 
(ii) if the injury affects the owner first-not as a 
consequence of an injury suffered by the entity-then the 
claim, like the injury, is direct and the owner has the 
standing in his, her, or its own right.98 
B. The Special Injury Rule 
93 
The special injury rule is just as easily stated, but far more difficult to 
apply. The difficulties become comprehensible once it is understood, as 
will be shown, that the special injury approach is conceptually flawed and, 
as a matter of doctrine, heretical.99 
Under the special injury rule, an owner has a direct rather than 
derivative claim only if the owner has suffered an injury that is special and 
distinct from not only any injury suffered by the entity but also any injury 
suffered by other owners. The paradigmatic example of such special injury 
involves a claim by an owner under some separate contract with the 
result of the other party's conduct." In re Estate of Bender, 806 N.E.2d 59, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that a party to an option contract with an LLC lacks standing to assert that the 
person who exercised the option on the LLC's behalf acted improperly: "[T]he Estate [the party 
that had granted the option] does not have a personal stake to challenge whether Bodkin [one of 
the managers of the LLC] properly exercised the Option on Beto's [the LLC's] behalf, nor can the 
Estate establish any injury resulting from the Option being exercised by Bodkin on behalf of 
Beto."). 
98 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), a seminal 
case on fiduciary duty among shareholders in a close corporation, illustrates the importance of 
properly framing the relevant injury. When the corporation redeemed the controlling 
shareholder's interest, the complainant minority shareholder did not attack the transaction as 
involving self-dealing or waste. /d. at 510-11. Those claims would have been derivative. 
Instead, the plaintiff hypothesized, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted, an 
"equal opportunity rule" under which the minority shareholder had a right to the same opportunity 
for redemption accorded the controlling shareholder. /d. at 518-19. Denying the minority 
shareholder this opportunity caused direct injury. 
99 See infra notes 112-124 and accompanying text. 
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entity100 or an "oppression claim"-that is, a claim that an owner has been 
singled out for mistreatment. 101 
100 E.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 828 F.2d 686, 693 (lith Cir. 1987) (holding 
that a former shareholder that pledged its controlling block of stock in a bank to Citibank, which 
then appointed directors who allegedly mismanaged the corporation in order to be able to buy 
shares at a reduced price, could bring a direct claim against the directors of the bank because, as a 
pledgor, the shareholder was situated differently from other shareholders: "The fact that his 
pledge is stock and that if the manipulated depreciation of the stock is proven would also give rise 
to a derivative suit by defendant as stockholder should not foreclose the suit as pledgor.") 
(citations omitted). When the contract involves all shareholders in their capacities as 
shareholders, i.e., a shareholders agreement, two cases hold that any breach of that agreement 
gives rise to a direct claim even though all shareholders have suffered the same injury and that 
injury is merely a consequence of a harm suffered by the corporation. See Hikita v. Nichiro 
Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Alaska 1986) (holding that a plaintiff 
shareholder could sue a fellow shareholder for breaching the shareholders' agreement by 
withdrawing from the venture "suddenly and without notice"); Harrington v. Batchelor, 781 So. 
2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (allowing a shareholder to bring a direct suit for a breach 
of a shareholders' agreement, despite the fact that all shareholders would be affected in the same 
way by the breach: "[A] shareholder can sue for breach of [a] contract to which he is a party, even 
if he has not suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders." 
(quoting Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1200)). 
101 E.g., Ayres v. AG Processing, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1204, 1208-09 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(holding LLC minority members who were "terminate[ d) as managers, employees and members" 
of the LLC after complaining about defendants' management actions had suffered special injury 
allowing them to bring direct claims); River Mgmt. Corp. v. Lodge Props. Inc., 829 P.2d 398, 
403, 405 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a minority shareholder had a valid direct cause of 
action against the close corporation's majority shareholder for oppressing the plaintiff by 
frontloading the corporation's expenses for a building project, then ousting the plaintiff from the 
board of directors and buying the plaintitrs shares when their value was low); Boyer v. 
Wilmington Materials, Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 903 (Del. Ch. 1999) (allowing a shareholder to bring a 
direct claim based on a special injury when the other shareholders sold the corporation's assets 
with the purpose of eliminating the plaintiff and another shareholder from continuing participation 
in the business); Fischer v. Fischer, No. C.A. 16864, 1999 WL 1032768, *1, *3-*4 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 4, 1999) (holding that special injury had been alleged by a plaintiff who claimed to have 
been wrongfully cashed out of a corporation by the defendants selling real estate at an unfairly 
low price to another corporation they owned, then dissolving the corporation in which the plaintiff 
had shares). Pleading can be crucial. For example, Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. 
Supp. 2d 1254, 1259-60 (D. Kan. 2000), concerned alleged breaches of fiduciary duty that had an 
obviously direct effect on the minority member (a revocable trust) and the member's grantor. 
Among the alleged misconduct were: "terminating the management agreement [with an affiliate 
of the minority member], terminating Mr. Carson [the grantor of the minority member] as 
president and general manager [of the LLC], severing [the LLC's] ties with Carson 
Communications [an affiliate of the minority member] and failing to pay Mr. Carson." !d. at 
1259. Even so, the court characterized the claims as derivative because the complaint itself 
described the injury as affecting the LLC rather than the member: "The complaint alleges that 
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The special injury rule has an interesting history. 102 When the Delaware 
Chancery Court first used the phrase "special injury" in the direct/derivative 
context, the phrase seemed merely another way of stating the direct harm 
analysis: 
There are cases ... in which there is injury to the 
corporation and also special injury to the individual 
stockholder. In such case a stockholder ... may proceed 
on his claim for the protection of his individual rights rather 
than in the right of the corporation. The action would then 
not constitute a derivative action. Here the wrong of which 
plaintiff complains is not a wrong inflicted upon him alone 
or a wrong affecting any particular right which he is 
asserting,-such as his pre-emptive rights as a stockholder, 
rights involving the control of the corporation, or a wrong 
affecting the stockholders and not the corporation,-but is 
an indirect injury as a result of the wrong done to the 
corporation. 103 
Unfortunately and inexplicably, in later decisions the formulation 
morphed, and the reference to indirect injury dropped out. 104 For example, 
in 1985, in Moran v. Household International, Inc., the Delaware Chancery 
theses [sic] decisions were not in the fmancial interest of [the LLC]. The complaint does not 
allege that the Carson Trust [the minority member] suffered a disproportionate injury." /d. 
102 For an interesting discussion of the case law history, see generally Kurt M. Heyman & 
Patricia L. Enerio, The Disappearing Distinction between Derivative and Direct Actions, 4 DEL. 
L. REV. 155 (2001). 
103 Eister v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. Ch. 1953) (citations omitted). The 
plaintiff asserted a direct claim for dilution, alleging the issuance of stock to executives and 
supervisors for insufficient consideration. /d. at 220-22. The court rejected the assertion, not 
because dilution could never be a direct claim, but rather because, in this instance, no plaintiff 
could show significant dilution. /d. at 223-24. 
Any injury which plaintiff may receive by reason of the dilution of his stock would be 
equally applicable to all the stockholders of defendant, since plaintiff holds such a small 
amount of stock in proportion to the amount of stock outstanding that the control or 
management of defendant would not be affected by the granting of these options, and, 
further, since there is no averment that the pre-emptive rights of plaintiff as a 
stockholder are affected by their issuance. 
/d. at 222. 
104 This was so even in cases quoting Elster. See Heyman & Enerio, supra note 102, at 159-
60. 
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Court stated the issue as whether the plaintiffs had suffered an "injury 
distinct from that suffered by other shareholders."105 Eight years later, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated the rule as follows: 
It is well settled that the test used to distinguish between 
derivative and individual harm is whether the plaintiff 
suffered "special injury." A special injury is established 
where there is a wrong suffered by plaintiff that was not 
suffered by all stockholders generally or where the wrong 
involves a contractual right of the stockholders, such as the 
right to vote. 106 
The special injury rule has its adherents. For example, in Loewen v. 
Galligan, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered a suit by shareholders 
who alleged breach of fiduciary duties in the wake of corporate mergers that 
decimated the value of their stock. 107 The court held that the plaintiffs 
could not bring their lawsuit directly because all the shareholders had 
suffered the same injury: "A special injury is established where there is a 
wrong suffered by the shareholder [that was] not suffered by all 
shareholders generally or where the wrong involves a contractual right of 
the shareholders, such as the right to vote." 108 
APA Excelsior III, L.P. v. Windley is another example. 109 Applying 
Georgia law, a federal district court held that the plaintiffs could not bring 
their claims for breach of fiduciary duties directly against the majority 
105 490 A.2d 1059, 1069-70 (Del. Ch.) (characterizing as derivative the plaintiffs' claims to 
invalidate a poison pill plan that restricted the alienability and marketability of their shares and 
limited their ability to engage in proxy contests because "they suffer[ ed] no injury distinct from 
that suffered by other shareholders as a result of this alleged restraint on the ability to gain control 
of Household through a proxy contest"), ajf'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
106 In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319,330 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted) (permitting 
the plaintiffs to bring individual claims for cash-value and voting power dilution, reasoning that 
the dilution hurt only the minority shareholders, not the majority); see also Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, 
L.P. v. S.R. Global Int'l Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143, 150 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("When a plaintiff alleges 
either an injury that is different from what is suffered by other shareholders (or partners) or one 
that involves a contractual right of shareholders (or partners) that is independent of the entity's 
rights, the claim is direct."). The Delaware Supreme Court recently recanted the heresy of the 
special injury rule. See infra notes 144-155 and accompanying text. 
107 See 882 P.2d 104, 109 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
108 !d. at 111. The result is not necessarily wrong. If the stock value of a surviving 
corporation decreases after a merger, that decrease might be incidental to damage done to the 
corporation by an improvident business combination. 
109 See generally 329 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
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shareholder because the injury that the plaintiff shareholders suffered was 
not "separate and distinct" from that suffered by other shareholders. 110 The 
opinion contains language that would preclude any class action by 
shareholders under state law, but also flirts with a formulation that might 
resonate with the direct harm approach: "To determine whether such a 
direct action is properly brought, courts consider 'whether the plaintiff is 
similarly situated to other shareholders, suffers the same injury, and retains 
the same opportunity to be made whole by a corporate recovery from the 
wrongdoer. "'111 
Despite its adherents, the special injury rule produces both conceptual 
contortions and practical difficulties. The contortions can be illustrated by 
a trio of cases: Curtis v. United States, 112 Gonzalez v. F airgale Properties 
Co., NV., 113 and In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig. 114 
Curtis correctly held that the former sole shareholder in a dissolved, 
closely held corporation could not bring an individual claim for breach of a 
contract to which the corporation, not the shareholder, had been a party. 115 
But the special injury rationale made no sense. What does it mean to refer 
to "a wrong suffered by the shareholder not suffered by all shareholders 
generally," when the corporation only has one shareholder? 116 
110 !d. at 1360. 
111 !d. (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 828 F.2d 686,693 (lith Cir. 1987)). 
The first two factors suggest that class actions are impossible because any claims suitable for class 
action treatment will necessarily be derivative. In contrast, the third factor suggests direct harm. 
112 63 Fed. Cl. 172, 179-80 (2004). 
113 241 F. Supp. 2d 512,516 (D. Md. 2002). 
114 747 A.2d 71, 78,80 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
115 Curtis, 63 Fed. Cl. at 180--81. 
116 /d. at 179; see also Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635,640--641 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (reaching the right result but for the wrong reason and upholding a ruling that a married 
couple who were the sole shareholders in a corporation did not have standing to assert a direct 
RICO claim based on an alleged fraud perpetrated against their corporation: "Because they are 
the sole shareholders they cannot show an injury distinct from that to other shareholders."); cf 
Godfrey v. Lafavour, No. 105-005 CV JWS, slip op., 2005 WL 2340714, at *4 (D. Alaska) 
(explaining that a direct lawsuit may be brought only when the plaintiff shareholder's injury is 
"separate and distinct" from that of other shareholders or when there is a "special duty" between 
the shareholder and the wrongdoer; holding that one member of a two-member LLC had direct 
claims against the other member for misrepresentation and usurpation of an LLC opportunity 
stemming from the other member's failure to tell the plaintiff that the LLC's right of first refusal 
on property had been triggered by a third party's offer to buy the property; stating that the plaintiff 
was "the only LLC member harmed by Defendant La[t]avour's actions and ... Defendant 
HeinOnline -- 58 Baylor L. Rev. 98 2006
98 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: I 
Gonzalez illustrates a prevalent conceptual "work around" involving 
voting rights. 117 When those who manage an entity somehow infringe the 
voting rights of all the owners, the special injury rule threatens to convert a 
clearly direct claim into a derivative one. The work around is to 
characterize voting rights not as aspects of stock ownership (or 
membership) but rather as contractual rights. This characterization permits 
the voting rights claim to proceed directly, under the contractual right rubric 
of the special injury rule. 
Thus, in Gonzalez the federal court stated that a shareholder who was 
not given a chance to vote on a sale of the corporation's land could bring an 
individual lawsuit because her contractual right to vote had been 
compromised--even though all the other shareholders had suffered the 
same deprivation. 118 The result is correct, but it is at best a contortion to 
characterize as a contract right one of the basic property "sticks" of a 
species of property created by statute. 119 
In In re Gaylord Container Corp., the court went beyond the contractual 
right contortion and came tantalizingly close to a direct harm analysis. 120 
Without expressly rejecting the special injury rule, which was then still the 
La[ flavour owed him fiduciary duties in his individual capacity") (internal quotations and footnote 
omitted). 
117 Gonzalez, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 515-18. 
118 !d. at 516 (commenting in dicta on Delaware law, before dismissing the suit for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction existed); see, 
e.g., In re Chalk Line Mfg., Bankr. No. 94-42773 (11), 1994 WL 394978, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
July 26, 1994); Lipton v. News Int'l, Pic., 514 A.2d 1075, 1076, 1079 (Del. 1986). 
119 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 7.2l(a) (2002) (providing, that, with limited exceptions: [E]ach 
outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a 
shareholders' meeting. Only shares are entitled to vote."); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 404(a) 
(rev. 1996), 6A U.L.A. 594 (2003) ("In a member-managed company: (1) each member has equal 
rights in the management and conduct of the company's business; and (2) ... any matter relating 
to the business of the company may be decided by a majority of the members."); NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 407(a) (Teleconference Draft May 2005), available at http:l/www.law.upenn.edu/blUulc/ulc_ 
frame.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) ("In a member-managed limited liability company, the 
following rules apply: (1) Each member has equal rights in the management and conduct of the 
limited liability company's activities .... "); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005) ("Unless 
otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the management of a limited liability 
company shall be vested in its members in proportion to the then current percentage or other 
interest of members in the profits of the limited liability company owned by all of the members, 
the decision of members owning more than 50 percent of the said percentage or other interest in 
the profits controlling .... "). 
120 747 A.2d 71, 78, 80 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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prevailing rule in Delaware, 121 the Delaware Chancery Court permitted a 
class comprised of all non-defendant shareholders to bring a direct claim 
against board members who had taken entrenchment actions. 122 Those 
actions had made it impractical for any entity to obtain control of the 
corporation without the board members' approval. 123 Noting that a 
derivative claim belongs to the enterprise, the Court asked: 
[W]hy should damages be awarded to the enterprise to 
remedy the economic harm caused because its owners were 
not permitted to sell their personal property? ... The mere 
fact that such an injury is to the economic property rights of 
all the stockholders rather than to their voting rights does 
not make the injury suffered any less "special" and non-
corporate.124 
Without conceptual contortions, the special injury rule can produce 
some very bad results, especially where the plaintiffs claim breach of 
121 As explained infra text accompanying notes 144-155, the Delaware Supreme Court 
recently recanted the heresy of the special injury rule and adopted the direct harm rule. 
122 Gaylord, 747 A.2d at 83. 
123 !d. at 73. The court cites Rev/on Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986), to support its point that shareholders may directly challenge defensive measures taken 
by a corporation's board in response to an actual acquisition proposal because the defensive 
measures affect shareholders' individual interests. !d. at 77 n.8. The savvy reader will have 
noticed that, under the special injury approach, a class action direct claim should typically be an 
oxymoron. See G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ind. 2001) (rejecting the 
special injury rule: "Some courts allow a direct action only if the shareholder's injury is distinct 
from the injuries sustained by other shareholders and the corporation. This is also problematic 
because some injuries may run to all shareholders-for example, refusal to convene an annual 
meeting-and be caused by a breach of the duty owed to every shareholder.") (citation omitted); 
Gaylord, 747 A.2d at 81 (stating that the special injury test's "focus on the similarity of treatment 
misses the central point that fundamental shareholder rights (e.g., voting and alienability) can be 
infringed by a variety of board actions that treat existing shareholders alike"); see also Heyman & 
Enerio, supra note I 02, at 164-65 ("[I]f taken to its logical conclusion, the focus on whether a 
stockholder suffered a distinct injury from that suffered by other stockholders (as opposed to 
whether a stockholder suffered a distinct injury from that suffered by the corporation) as the 
prerequisite for maintaining a direct claim would mean that there could never be a class of all 
stockholders asserting direct claims."). 
124 Gaylord, 747 A.2d at 80. Note that this decision is at odds with Moran v. Household 
International, Inc., which characterized the plaintiffs' claims to invalidate a "poison pill" plan that 
restricted the alienability and marketability of their shares as derivative and limited the plaintiffs' 
ability to engage in proxy contests. 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch. 1985) ajf'd, 500 A.2d 1346 
(Del. 1985); see discussion supra note 105. 
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disclosure duties, improper dilution, or denial of voting rights. For 
example, in Bovee v. Lyndonville Savings. Bank & Trust, the Vermont 
Supreme Court ruled that shareholders could not bring a direct action 
against a bank corporation and several of its directors and officers for 
failing to provide certain requested information, because the claim failed to 
establish harm distinct from other shareholders. 125 To deem a shareholder's 
claim for information from the corporation to be one belonging to the 
corporation is at best confused and at worst ludicrous. 126 
The Eighth Circuit produced a similarly bad result in Arent v. 
Distribution Sciences, /nc. 127 Plaintiffs brought direct claims against a 
corporation that was going to merge with the corporation in which they 
owned shares. 128 The plaintiffs alleged fraudulent nondisclosure of 
information concerning the merger and the Eighth Circuit had to apply 
Minnesota law. 129 Applying that law, the court rejected the direct claims 
because "[p ]lain tiffs do not allege that they suffered injury different than 
that suffered by other ... shareholders."130 Thus, to paraphrase Abraham 
Lincoln, if you "fool all of the people some of the time," 131 they have no 
effective remedy under state entity law. 132 
125 811 A.2d 143, 146--47 (Vt. 2002). 
126 Prior to abandoning the special injury rule, the Delaware Supreme Court got around the 
disclosure dilemma by associating the right to information to the fundamental contractual right to 
vote. See In re Tri-Star Pictures Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 331-32 (Del. 1993) (holding that even under 
the special injury rule, minority shareholders had individual causes of action against the 
corporation's controlling shareholder for breaching the duty to disclose material facts about a 
proposed business combination: "Thus, by its alleged breaches of the duty of disclosure, [the 
controlling shareholder] materially and adversely affected the minority class' right to cast an 
informed vote. Such conduct, if true, is an improper interference with exercise of the franchise. It 
is a unique special harm to each uninformed shareholder for which the wrongdoer is answerable in 
damages."). 




131 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 451 (Justin Kaplan ed. 1992) {"You can fool 
some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all 
of the people all of the time."). 
132 Cf Potter v. Janus lnv. Fund, No. 03-CV-0692-DRH, 2004 WL 1173201, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 
Feb 12, 2004) (concluding that the plaintiffs' claims of stock equity dilution arising from the 
defendant mutual funds' allowance of short term buying and selling by some investors, while the 
plaintiffs and others were encouraged to invest long-term, were based on a "direct and individual 
harm ... a claim not actionable by the corporation itself' and could, thus, be brought directly). 
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The dilution cases are more complex, because some dilution claims are 
properly derivative. For example, if an entity sells new ownership interests 
too cheaply, the dilution suffered by the existing owners is a mere 
consequence of the entity having been harmed by a bad deal. 133 However, 
this analysis is different when the dilution involves a QVC issue (i.e., when 
the dilution also results in the corporation having for the first time a 
controlling shareholder). 134 In such situations, the owners lose forever the 
possibility of sharing in a "control premium," and the injury is therefore to 
them and not the entity. 
This QVC-type harm is direct regardless of whether the party obtaining 
control is a pre-existing owner. Yet in In re Paxon Communication Corp., 
the Delaware Chancery Court held that some types of QVC claims are 
derivative. 135 The case involved an arrangement under which a corporation, 
not already a shareholder, obtained shares of stock and stock options that 
allowed the acquiring corporation to obtain seventy percent of the voting 
rights in Paxon Communications. 136 Stating, in essence, that a QVC claim 
is a direct action only if a significant existing shareholder's interest is 
increased at the expense of the other shareholders, the court held that direct 
claims had to be dismissed because (i) the company benefiting from the 
dilution was a third party; (ii) all existing shareholders suffered the same 
alleged harm; and therefore (iii) no shareholder could claim a special 
injury. 137 
The Potter court could see the injury as special to some shareholders because not all of the 
shareholders were affected. In some circwnstances, federal and state securities laws may provide 
direct relief in fool-them-all situations, but this Article is limited to claims brought under state 
entity law. 
133 Gentile v. Rossette, No. Civ.A. 20213-NC, 2005 WL 2810683, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2005) (holding that dilution simpliciter is a derivative claim); In re Berkshire Realty Co. S'holder 
Litig., No. Civ.A. 17242,2002 WL 31888345, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) ("Like waste claims, 
dilution claims are generally considered derivative claims. Such an alleged injury is indirect 
because it falls upon all shareholders equally and falls only upon the individual shareholder in 
relation to his proportionate share of stock as a result of the direct injury being done to the 
corporation.") (footnote omitted). 
134 In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994), 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that Rev/on duties, explained supra note 88, were triggered 
when a corporation's directors contemplated a deal that, while retaining the corporation intact, 
would have eliminated forever any chance for the shareholders to share in the control premiwn 
available when an entity is put up for sale. 
135 No. CIV.A.l7568, 2001 WL 812028, at *3, *5 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2001). 
136 Id. at *3. 
137 /d. at *5; see also Grogan v. O'Neil, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189 (D. Kan. 2004) (applying 
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Bad results are less frequent with voting claims, because, as explained 
above, special injury courts typically work around the problem. 138 
However, when a court misses the work-around the results are stark. Thus 
in Geer v. Cox, a federal district court held that the special injury rule 
barred a shareholder from bringing a direct claim against directors who had 
allegedly sold assets without the shareholder approval required by law. 139 
then applicable Delaware law and holding, under the special injury rule, that a Rev/on claim 
should have been brought derivatively because all shareholders suffered the same alleged injury of 
a reduced price for their shares); Dieterich v. Harrer, 857 A.2d 1017, 1027 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(holding that a Rev/on claim could not be filed directly by a shareholder because the corporation 
was the one hurt by the directors' alleged pre-merger sabotage of negotiations: "[The Rev/on 
duty] is plainly the directors' normal duty to manage the affairs of the corporation, albeit in the 
context of a corporation searching for alternatives. That duty is owed to the corporation and not 
separately or independently to the stockholders."); cf In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 
A.2d 319, 330 (Del. 1993) ("[A] claim of stock dilution and a corresponding reduction in a 
stockholder's voting power is an individual claim."). In re Tri-Star Pictures recited the special 
injury rule, but explained that the majority shareholder had benefited from the diluting action 
whereas the minority shareholders as a group had suffered, which was apparently personal enough 
to count as a direct special injury. In re Tri-Star Picutres, 634 A.2d at 330; see Lipton v. News 
Int'l, Pic., 514 A.2d 1075, 1075-76, 1079 (Del. 1986) (holding shareholder had a special injury 
and a direct cause of action arising from the corporation's exchange agreement with an investor, 
because the arrangement created significant "veto power over all shareholder actions subject to the 
80% supermajority voting requirement" and because: "The right to vote is a contractual right that 
[a shareholder] possesses as a shareholder of [the corporation] which is independent of any right 
of [the corporation]."). But see In re Chalk Line Mfg., Bankr. No. 93-42773 (11), 1994 WL 
394978, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. July 26, 1994) (holding that, even under special injury rule, 
minority shareholders had a direct claim of action for dilution of their proportionate ownership in 
the corporation because it was a breach of the majority shareholders' fiduciary duty to the 
minority but providing no detailed statement of facts); In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 
877 A.2d 975, 980 (Del. Ch. 2005) (allowing plaintiff shareholders to bring lawsuit directly for 
breach of Rev/on duties but holding that the corporation's board did not breach those duties); 
Marcoux v. Prim, 04 CVS 920, 2004 NCBC 5, at ~ 53--60 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004), 
available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/ 2004%20NCBC%205.htm (applying 
Delaware law and holding that a shareholder's Rev/on claim against a CEO who allegedly 
manipulated the merger process to give himself an "extravagant" benefit package using money 
that otherwise would have gone to shareholders could be brought directly: "The 'injury' results 
from the diminished value that a shareholder would receive from a merger process that prevents 
the shareholders from achieving the highest value for their shares in a change of control merger. 
The treasury of the shareholder is depleted, not the treasury ofthe corporation."). See also Gentile 
v. Rossette, No. Civ.A. 20213-NC, 2005 WL 2810683, at *6 n.58 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2005) 
(applying Tooley and noting, in a bit of revisionist history, that generally "dilution claims 
emphasizing the diminishment of voting power have been categorized as direct claims"). 
138 See supra notes 108-118 and accompanying text. 
139 242 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1018 (D. Kan. 2003). 
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The court stated that: 
The right to vote is a right owed to all shareholders with 
voting status rather than a separate and distinct harm. 
Because plaintiff has failed to show that there was any duty 
owed to him that was not owed to all shareholders of his 
status, or that he suffered any harm individually, his direct 
claim must be dismissed .... 140 
103 
Special injury is truly a confusing concept when used "as the test for 
determining whether a claim is derivative or direct." 141 The confusion is 
inevitable, because the special injury rule rests on a logical error-the 
fallacy of affirming the consequent: 142 
[A}s a matter of consequence when a shareholder's injury 
is indirect, all shareholders have in common the same 
(indirect) injury. It does not logically follow, however, that 
whenever shareholders have a common injury they 
necessarily suffered their injury indirectly. 
In logical terms, the error is as follows: 
if P then Q (if indirect, then necessarily 
common) 
does not mean 
if Q then P (if common, then necessarily 
indirect)[.] 143 
In 2004, in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., Delaware 
reconsidered its approach, corrected its logical error, and disavowed the 
special injury heresy: "In our view, the concept of 'special injury' that 
appears in some Supreme Court and Court of Chancery cases is not helpful 
to a proper analytical distinction between direct and derivative actions. We 
now disapprove the use of the concept of 'special injury' as a tool in that 
analysis."144 
140 !d .. 
141 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004). 
142 STEPHEN F. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 69 (5th ed. 1989). 
143 Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 21, at 1252 (footnote omitted). 
144 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004). 
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As a replacement, the court adopted the direct harm approach: "[T]he 
stockholder must allege something other than an injury resulting from a 
wrong to the corporation."145 The court went on to add a second prong. 
Delaware courts must also consider "the relief that could result"-that is, 
whether the relief would properly go to the entity or directly to the 
owners. 146 However, the court acknowledged that the second prong is 
logically implicit in the first. 147 
Delaware's disavowal of special injury led promptly to greater 
coherence in this area of law. For example, the next year in Weinstein v. 
Schwartz, the Seventh Circuit applied Tooley and permitted a direct claim 
by a shareholder in a closely held corporation who was seeking a 
declaratory judgment that other shareholders had previously sold their 
shares and therefore could not vote on a sale of a horse farm owned by the 
corporation. 148 The plaintiff rented the farm from the corporation and 
opposed the sale. 149 The court considered where the alleged harm would 
fall (the first prong) and who would benefit from the proposed remedy (the 
second prong). 150 
The Tooley analysis also guided a New York state trial court to the 
correct result. In Higgins v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., seatholders on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) brought a class action lawsuit 
against the NYSE CEO and board, claiming breach of fiduciary duties and 
seeking to enjoin a proposed merger. 151 The complaint alleged that: (i) the 
consideration to be paid to NYSE seatholders under the merger agreement 
was unfair, (ii) the CEO had extensive ties to the other party to the merger, 
and (iii) that those ties had caused the CEO and board members to favor the 
other party during merger negotiations. 152 The complaint alleged "disparate 
allocation of equity, resulting in more seatholders' equity being contributed 
to the merged corporation, non-seatholder employees, and Archipelago [the 
other entity in the merger] shareholders, while 'short-changing' NYSE 
145 /d. at 1038. 
146/d. 
147 /d. at 1036. 
148 422 F.3d 476, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying Delaware law). 
149 /d. at 476-77. 
150 /d. at 478. Ironically, the special injury rule may have produced the same result, as the 
plaintiff had a special contractual relationship with the corporation-i.e., the farm lease. 
151 No. 601646/2005, 2005 WL 2140168, at *4, *10-*11, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 02, 2005). 
152 /d. at *1-*4. 
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seatholders from realizing the full value of their equity positions in the 
NYSE by a higher payout of shareholders' equity."153 
Applying Tooley, the court held that the complaint stated a direct claim: 
Under the Tooley test ... , the loss of seats in exchange for 
an unfairly low payout of shareholders' equity individually 
harms the seatholders and is otherwise not dependent on a 
harm to the NYSE. In contrast, the NYSE is being 
benefited, or, put differently, is not injured; by paying less 
equity out to the seatholders, the NYSE retains more 
shareholders' equity, translating into more assets appearing 
on the NYSE balance sheet that is being transferred to the 
merged corporation, which cannot be characterized as an 
injury to the corporate entity .... Moreover, under the 
second prong of Tooley, there is no monetary relief that 
would go [to] the NYSE for the alleged breaches of duty 
that results in more, rather than less, assets appearing on its 
balance sheet as a result of the lower payout of 
shareholders' equity .154 
Whether Delaware's conversion will eventually heal the schism in the law 
and completely eliminate the special injury line of analysis remains to be 
seen. 155 The problem for LLC law is that, so long as some courts continue 
153 /d. at *11. 
154/d. at * 10. 
155 It is perhaps worth noting that some other jurisdictions saw the light before Delaware, and 
some long before. See Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To sue directly 
under Maryland law, a shareholder must allege an injury distinct from an injury to the corporation, 
not from that of other shareholders."); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 
1969) ("The individual wrong necessary to support a suit by a shareholder need not be unique to 
that plaintiff. The same injury may affect a substantial number of shareholders. If the injury is 
not incidental to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action exists."); Mann v. 
Kemper Fin. Cos., 618 N.E.2d 317, 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("We reject defendants' proffered test 
of shareholder standing of whether a shareholder alleges unique harm. A plaintiff shareholder's 
injury may not be unique to that particular shareholder, but a plaintiff's cause of action could still 
be individual instead of derivative."). Even after Tooley, some courts continue to misunderstand 
the relationship between harm to the entity and harm to the owners. In Shirvanian v. DeFrates, 
for example, the court determined that a shareholder's state-law claim for fraud was derivative, 
because the fraud concerned alleged mismanagement of the corporate enterprise and the alleged 
misstatements would have not been misstatements without the alleged mismanagement: 
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to apply the special injury rule to corporations, those courts will likely (and 
perhaps ineluctably) give the same unfortunate treatment to limited liability 
compames. 
C. The "Duty Owed" Cases 
A third line of cases addresses the direct/derivative distinction by 
identifying the duty allegedly breached and then asking to whom that duty 
is owed or whose rights are infringed. For example, the Indiana Supreme 
Court rejected both the direct harm and special injury tests and stated that 
the "correct approach" is based on whose rights the shareholder asserts. 156 
If the action is based on "a primary or personal right belonging to the 
plaintiff-stockholder," rights derived from the corporation's articles of 
incorporation, state law, agreements among shareholders or between the 
corporation and its shareholders, the claim is direct. 157 In contrast, if the 
action vindicates a "primary right of the corporation," the claim is 
derivative. 158 
To decide if the hann was to the corporation or to the stockholder individually, [Tooley] 
suggested the most relevant question is whether the stockholder can prevail without 
showing an injury to the corporation . . . . The stockholder must demonstrate that the 
duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without 
showing a corresponding injury to the corporation. Applying those principles here 
leads to the conclusion that the Shirvanians' complaints are derivative, not direct, and 
could be asserted only on behalf of the corporation. The misrepresentations the 
Shirvanians allege caused their injury were based on mismanagement of the 
corporation's assets. The Shirvanians cannot prove their injury without proving an 
injury to the corporation. We hold, therefore, that the Shirvanians' suit is derivative 
under Delaware law. 
161 S.W.3d 102, 110--11 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2004, pet. filed). This holding turns 
Tooley on its head, or at least its side, because the alleged mismanagement directly caused hann to 
the corporation, but the alleged misrepresentation was about the corporation not to the 
corporation. With regard to the alleged misrepresentation, there was no cognizable harm to the 
corporation at all. See also Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(purporting to apply Tooley, relying on Shirvanian's rationale, but also asserting that the alleged 
misrepresentations somehow hanned the corporation by occasioning a fall in the selling price of 
the corporation's stock). 
156 See G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227,234--35,237 (Ind. 2001). 
157 /d. at 235. 
158 /d.; see also Chanoff v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1011, 1020, 1022 (D. Conn. 
1994) (noting that corporate officers and directors are in a fiduciary relationship with, and owe 
duties to, the corporation itself and that any hann suffered by shareholders from the breach of 
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A federal district court has come to a similar conclusion, albeit 
expressed in terms of duty: 
In short, what differentiates a direct from a derivative suit 
is neither the nature of the damages that result from the 
defendant's alleged conduct, nor the identity of the party 
who sustained the brunt of the damages, but rather the 
source of the claim of right itself. If the right flows from 
the breach of a duty owed by the defendants to the 
corporation, the harm to the investor flows through the 
corporation, and a suit brought by the shareholder to 
redress the harm is one "derivative" of the right retained by 
the corporation. If the right flows from the breach of a duty 
owed directly to the plaintiff independent of the plaintiff's 
status as a shareholder, investor, or creditor of the 
corporation, the suit is "direct."159 
these duties is merely derivative of the harm to the corporation; holding that, by trading on inside 
information without disclosing the information to the public, the corporate officers did not violate 
a direct duty to shareholders, even if the officers may have breached their duty to the corporation; 
dismissing plaintiffs' direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty). 
159 Branch v. Ernst & Young, No. Civ. A. 93-10024-RGS, 1995 WL 791941, at •2, •4, •6 (D. 
Mass. Dec. 22, 1995). The phrase "independent of the plaintiff's status as a shareholder, investor, 
or creditor of the corporation" sounds like a restatement of the special injury rule, except that the 
reference to "creditor of the corporation" would eliminate one of that rule's major subcategories 
of special injury. /d. 
The law of general partnerships reflects the "duty owed" approach. See, e.g., Lefkovitz v. 
Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2005), cerl. denied, 126 S. Ct. 333 (2005) (involving a 
dispute among partners of a general partnership). Judge Posner analyzed the matter as follows: 
Jarnis is a Florida general partnership, and under Florida law the partners in a general 
partnership owe fiduciary obligations to each other. (This is the general rule, not 
anything peculiar to Florida.) So the plaintiffs were not required to file this as a 
derivative, or any kind of representative, suit. The plaintiffs could sue, and are suing, 
on their own behalf rather than on behalf of the partnership. 
/d. at 777 (citations omitted). Of course, it is virtually axiomatic that derivative claims do not 
exist with regard to general partnerships. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 405(b) cmt. 2 (rev. 1997), vol. 6, pt. 
1 U.L.A. 150 (2001) ("Under subsection (b), a partner may bring a direct suit against the 
partnership or another partner for almost any cause of action arising out of the conduct of the 
partnership business .... RUPA does not authorize derivative actions .... "); see WILLIAM J. 
CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 14:9 n.l (2004) (noting that RUPA does not authorize derivative 
actions); Kleinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 841-42. For an analysis suggesting that the 
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Sometimes this approach produces correct results. For example, in 
McCann v. McCann, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the attempt by a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation to bring a direct lawsuit against 
the other shareholders for breach of fiduciary duties, negligence, self-
dealing, conversion, and waste. 160 The direct harm approach would have 
characterized the alleged harms as first befalling the corporation. The court 
opined instead: "The duties that [the plaintiff] has alleged the directors 
breached in this case do not appear to be a 'special duty owed to the 
stockholder by the wrongdoer and having its origin in circumstances 
independent of the plaintiff's status as a shareholder. "'161 
The duty owed approach also appears in Mason v. F.D.I.C., in which a 
federal district court held that a shareholder could directly bring an action 
for breach of ,warranty in a letter of credit because a duty was owed to him 
under the warranty in his role as pledgor of security for the loan. 162 This 
holding is consistent both with the direct harm approach and the special 
injury rule. The court also characterized as direct the plaintiffs claim that 
another shareholder and the lender had conspired to push the corporation 
into bankruptcy. 163 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants meant to 
"deprive him of his rights as a director of [the corporation] and to deprive 
him of his stock in [the corporation]," which were individual wrongs. 164 
In general, however, the duty owned/rights infringed approach has the 
matter upside down. Standing is about harm, not duty. Certainly the phrase 
"cognizable injury" presupposes some breach of obligation, but the 
standing inquiry focuses on the injury component. 165 
The problem is more than doctrinal incoherence. Given the loose way 
in which some courts (and legislatures) describe the fiduciary duty of entity 
managers, the duty owed or rights infringed approach provides a bad lens 
through which to see the direct/derivative distinction. Courts often speak 
partnership action for an accounting has provided general partnerships with a rule functionally 
similar to the direct/derivative distinction, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, There's No Accounting for 
Taste: The Role (If Any) for Partnership's 'Accounting' Remedy in the Modern World of Limited 
Liability Companies, 41 TULSA L. REv. (forthcoming Sununer 2006) [hereinafter Kleinberger, 
Accounting]. 
160 61 P.3d 585, 590-91 (Idaho 2002). 
161 /d. (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2D CORP.§ 2249 (1986)). 
162 888 F. Supp. 799, 804--05 (S.D. Tex. 1995). 
163 /d. at 808. 
164 /d. 
165 See discussion supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. 
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loosely of directors owing fiduciary duties both to the corporation and to its 
shareholders, 166 and some legislatures have taken a similar approach with 
limited liability companies. For example, the Alabama LLC statute 
provides that "[i]n a limited liability company managed by its 
members ... the only fiduciary duties a member owes to the company or to 
its other members are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care."167 The 
statute also suggests that the duty of care runs both to the LLC and its 
members. 168 
Similar or even identical language can be found in statutes governing 
other unincorporated entities and in some corporate statutes as well. For 
instance, Florida's newly enacted version of the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act (ULPA) (2001) refers to the "fiduciary duties that a general 
partner has to the limited partnership and the other partners."169 The 
Colorado statute governing exculpatory provisions in corporate charters 
states that, subject to certain limitations, "[i]f so provided in the articles of 
166 E.g., Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 173 (2d Cir. 2002) ("But Maryland courts have 
clearly established the proposition that directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to both the 
corporation and the shareholders."); In re Northgate Computer Sys., Inc., 240 B.R. 328, 357 
(Bania. D. Minn. 1999) ("More recently, the Minnesota appellate courts have recognized that at 
least certain types of shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and, by extension, to 
other shareholders."); In re Williams, 152 B.R. 123, 127 (Bania. N.D. Tex. 1992) (stating that 
"prior to a bankruptcy filing management's fiduciary duty went to the corporation's 
shareholders"); Manzo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ.A. 18451-NC, 2002 WL 31926606, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 19, 2002) ("This obligation arises from the fiduciary duties that directors of Delaware 
corporations owe both to the shareholders and to the corporation itself."). 
167 ALA. CODE§ 10-12-21{e) {1975). 
168 Id. § I0-12-21{g) {1975). The statute takes a parallel stance toward the duties of loyalty 
and care in a manager-managed LLC. Id. § 10-12-2l{k) {1975). 
169 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.1408{1) (West 2006) (emphasis added). This formulation 
originated in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which does not contemplate or allow 
derivative claims, and was incorporated in the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and the 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), which do. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 159, 
§ 14:9 n.l; see also UN1F. P'SHIP ACT§ 405(b) cmt. 2 (rev. 1997), vol. 6, pt. l U.L.A. !50 (2001) 
("Under subsection (b), a partner may bring a direct suit against the partnership or another partner 
for almost any cause of action arising out of the conduct of the partnership business . . . . Since 
general partners are not passive investors like limited partners, RUPA does not authorize 
derivative actions .... "). An official comment to ULPA (2001) seeks to explain that the 
formulation is not intended to override the direct/derivative distinction. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT, 
§ 408(a) cmt. (rev. 2001), 6A U.L.A. 62-63 (2003) ("The reference to 'the other partners' does 
not affect the distinction between direct and derivative claims. See Section 100 I (b) (prerequisites 
for a partner bringing a direct claim)."). Section 100l{b) is discussed infra notes 206-210 and 
accompanying text. 
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incorporation, the corporation shall eliminate or limit the personal liability 
of a director to the corporation or to its shareholders .... "170 In sum, the 
duty owed or rights infringed approach cannot be the proper test for making 
the direct/derivative distinction, because the test would create only 
confusion. 171 
V. A SPECIAL RULE FOR CLOSELY HELD ENTITIES 
Corporate law has continually wrestled with the direct/derivative 
distinction in the context of closely held corporations, and, because almost 
all LLCs are closely held, it is important to understand how the closely-
held-corporation law approaches the distinction. 172 
Most United States jurisdictions do not have 
direct/derivative rule for closely held corporations. 173 
any special 
The Virginia 
17°COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-108-402 (West 1998) (emphasis added). This language is 
based on DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), which was the Delaware Legislature's reaction to 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and spawned copy cat legislation around the 
country. Matthew G. Dore, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional Malpractice 
Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 127, 181 
(1995). 
171 See, e.g., Foster-Thompson, LLC v. Thompson, No. 8:04-CV-2128T30EAJ, 2005 WL 
3093510, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2005) (granting summary judgment against the defendant's 
third party complaint/counterclaim for conversion of LLC assets because the claim was derivative, 
but denying summary judgment on the defendant's "personal breach of fiduciary duty claim" 
against his fellow members because the relevant LLC statute "creates a duty of loyalty and a duty 
of care to the limited liability company and its members"). 
172 It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate in detail the nature of a closely-held 
entity. The following definition will suffice: 
In this Article the phrase "closely held businesses" refers to businesses, regardless of 
legal form, that fit the following criteria: (i) few owners; (ii) ownership interests not 
freely transferable (due to legal or practical limitations, or both); and (iii) most (and 
often all) of the owners actively engaged in managing or otherwise working in the 
business. 
Kleinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 829. 
173 See Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to 
adopt any special rules for direct lawsuits in the context of a close corporation: "Corporations are 
not partnerships. Whether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities. Commercial rules 
should be predictable; this objective is best served by treating corporations as what they are, 
allowing the investors and other participants to vary the rules by contract if they think deviations 
are warranted."); Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Minn. 1999) (repudiating an 
intermediate court's effort at a more nuanced approach); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d I, 14 
(S.D. !997) (declining to adopt any special rule for close corporations: "[Plaintiff] seeks the best 
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Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he overwhelming majority rule is that an 
action for injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder 
on an individual basis and must be brought derivatively."174 However, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed a special approach, which has 
become law in some jurisdictions.175 Under section 7.0l(d) of the ALI's 
of both business entities: limited liability provided by a corporate structure and direct 
compensation for corporate losses .... Recovery by the corporation ensures that all of the 
corporate participants-stockholders, trade creditors, employees and others will recover according 
to their contractual and statutory obligations."). 
174 Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 674-75 (Va. 2001) (rejecting as flawed the ALI's 
proposed approach). 
175 Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. 1995) (adopting ALI approach); Mynatt v. 
Collis, 57 P.3d 513, 529-30 (Kan. 2002) (adopting ALl approach); Derouen v. Murray, 604 So. 
2d 1086, 1091 n.2 (Miss. 1992) (adopting ALI approach in dicta; allowing plaintiff to continue 
with his derivative lawsuit); Trieweiler v. Sears, 689 N.W.2d 807, 838 (Neb. 2004) (adopting ALI 
approach); Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 46-47 (N.H. 2005) (adopting ALl approach but 
adding factors: (I) whether the corporation has a disinterested board of directors who could 
evaluate the derivative claim fairly, (2) whether all the corporation's shareholders were involved 
in the lawsuit, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and (3) whether the suit has arisen simply because 
the minority shareholders have different goals from the majority); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 
469 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (N.D. 1991) (applying draft version of ALI approach); Aurora Credit 
Servs. v. Liberty W. Dev., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280-81 (Utah 1998) (adopting ALI approach for 
minority shareholders); see Redeker v. Litt, No. 04-0637, 2005 WL 1224697, at *6 (Iowa Ct. 
App. May 25, 2005) (using the policies of the ALI approach to find that the shareholders could 
pursue a direct action, but adding that the decision depended on the "unique circumstances" of the 
case); RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION § 1.02 [2] (2003) 
("Delaware and most other states have not adopted the so-called closely held corporation 
exception."); James R. Burkhard, LLC Member and Limited Partner Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Claims: Direct or Derivative Actions?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 19, 53 (2003) (stating 
that twelve states have adopted the ALI provision for close corporations); Robert B. Thompson, 
The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 726 (1993) (noting the 
trend towards judicial recognition of a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty). 
Texas has by statute adopted an approach similar to the ALI approach. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT 
ANN. art. 5.14 § L (Vernon 2003) (applying until 2010 to Texas corporations formed prior to 
January I, 2006); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN.§ 21.563 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (applying to Texas 
corporations formed on or after January I, 2006 and to all Texas corporations, regardless of when 
formed, beginning January I, 2010). The Texas statutes provide that, "if justice requires," a court 
may treat a shareholder derivative proceeding of a closely held corporation as a direct action 
brought by the shareholder for the shareholder's own benefit, and recovery in a direct or 
derivative proceeding may be paid either directly to the plaintiff or to the corporation if necessary 
to protect the interests of creditors or other shareholders of the corporation. TEX. Bus. ORG. 
CODE ANN. § 21.563. A "closely held corporation" is defined for these purposes in the Texas 
statutes as a corporation with less than 35 shareholders and that has no shares listed on a national 
securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market by one or more members of 
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Principals of Corporate Governance: 
In the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its 
discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a 
direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses 
applicable only to derivative actions, and order an 
individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not 
(i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a 
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests 
of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair 
distribution of the recovery among all interested persons. 176 
I have elsewhere criticized the ALI approach as providing courts 
insufficient guidance for when to "override" the direct/derivative 
distinction177 and for being insufficiently sensitive to the way the distinction 
protects the deal among closely-held entity owners: 
As explained by the ALI, "the concept of a corporate injury 
that is distinct from any injury to the shareholders 
approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with only a 
handful of shareholders." 
The problem with this approach is that it does not 
adequately understand (let alone take into account) the 
consequences of shifting from the entity construct to the 
aggregate. The ALI assumed that the procedural 
consequences of the direct-derivative distinction had no 
place in a close corporation, and was content to let the 
courts decide-without any additional guideposts-when 
to order the shift. But the procedural consequences of the 
distinction are not inevitably bulwarks for the oppressor. 
They may instead be an important part of the balance of 
power between majority and minority owners. In 
a national securities association. TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 § L(2); TEX. BUS. ORG. 
CODE ANN. § 21.563(a). 
176 2 AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 7.0l(d) (1994). 
177 Kieinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 854 n.l29 (noting that comment e of section 7.01 
provides that, once the ALI's three criteria are met, "[t]he court should then have equitable power 
to treat the action as direct if the corporation is closely held" and criticizing the comment for 
"stating no further guidelines for the exercise of that equitable power"). 
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particular, those consequences help prevent a simple 
dispute over business judgment from becoming full-fledged 
litigation at the whim of a disgruntled holder of a minority 
interest. 178 
113 
It might seem inevitable that jurisdictions that adopted the ALI 
approach for close corporations will do the same for closely-held LLCs, but 
the advent of LLCs might provide ALI jurisdictions an opportunity to 
reconsider. 179 Certainly, "back in the day" formal barriers inherent in 
corporate law doctrine made it difficult or even impossible to achieve 
appropriate remedies for oppression.180 At that time, as a result, almost all 
oppression claims likely had some merit. When the odds are harshly 
against plaintiffs, false or dubious claims are less likely to be made. 181 But 
today in most jurisdictions, the situation is strikingly different; a claim of 
oppression is likely to survive a summary judgment motion, unless the 
claimant pushes the envelope too far. 182 
178 See Kleinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 854 (footnotes omitted) (citing 2 AM. LAW 
INSTITUTE, supra note 176, § 7.0 I cmt. e). 
179 /d. at 853 (stating that "courts that have adopted the [ALI] approach for close corporations 
will likely do so for LLCs" and noting that "[t]hat is what happened recently ... in Georgia, 
where the court of appeals extrapolated from long-standing Georgia corporate case law to adopt 
the override approach for LLCs." (citing Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 615 S.E.2d 1, 8 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005))); see supra note 168 (discussing Texas's approach for closely held LLCs and closely 
held corporations compared to the ALI approach). 
180 Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held 
Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1143, 1148-54 (1990). 
181 See, e.g., David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 
CAL. L. REV. 847, 862-63 (1986) ("The distortions created by the focus on state of mind 
[requirement in libel cases] ... make the current damage action almost worthless to an honest 
victim of a defamatory falsehood. That plaintiff faces less than a ten percent chance of ever 
seeing the falsity claim adjudicated, while spending years in expensive litigation over state of 
mind. Only rare individuals will take on such daunting odds."); Anna-Maria Marshall, Closing 
The Gaps: Plaintiffs in Pivotal Sexual Harassment Cases, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 761, 770--71 
(1998) ("[In the early days of sexual harassment claims,] litigation was a costly 
tool. ... [B]ecause the law was unsettled in the area of sexual harassment, the plaintiffs had 
trouble finding lawyers willing to take on cases where the odds of winning were dubious. When 
they finally hired lawyers, they found that their cases went on for years in emotionally draining 
proceedings where their personal and professional lives were cracked open and subjected to 
harshly critical scrutiny."). 
182 See, e.g., Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365, 372, 377-81 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2005) (holding that a shareholder-employee's "termination substantially defeated her 
reasonable expectations that she would be employed by the corporation, receive a salary, and take 
part in its management" even though the trial testimony showed evidence of serious misconduct 
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As a result, the flexibility and unguided discretion proposed by the ALI 
for trial courts translates into a serious threat to the stability of closely held 
businesses (many of which are also small businesses). As the South Dakota 
Supreme Court has explained in rejecting the ALI approach: 
Those who operate and manage these [small, corporate] 
farms and businesses, often the majority shareholders, 
should not be subject to the demands of minority 
shareholders whose concern may be solely that of 
dividends and not the farm or business itself. Many of 
these small corporations and their management are ill-
prepared to invest the time and money required to fend off 
a minority shareholder suit and are therefore influenced by 
the mere threat of such litigation. 183 
It is no answer to assert that closely held businesses and their owner-
managers can rely on the discretion of the judiciary. There is no more 
by the terminated employee; fmding that the majority shareholder had not acted oppressively; but 
remanding for an inquiry into remedies short of dissolution, including a buy-out; noting that 
"dissolution itself remains an ultimate remedy should none of the others prove feasible"); 
Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof'ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(interpreting a shareholder agreement drafted at the behest of the plaintiff shareholder that 
provided for no-cause, involuntary withdrawal of any shareholder and a formula-based buy-out 
upon withdrawal; holding that the agreement rendered unreasonable the plaintiff's claim of unfair 
prejudice relating to the involuntary withdrawal and buy-out, but remanding for a determination as 
to whether the corporation's termination of the plaintiff's employment was somehow "unfairly 
prejudicial" to the shareholder in his capacity as a shareholder-employee); Pooley v. Mankato 
Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding the buy-out of a 
minority shareholder, without any discount, because the corporation had terminated the 
shareholder's employment following his assault on a fellow shareholder and his criminal damage 
to a customer's truck); Sawyerv. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at 
*2-*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (upholding a buy-out for a minority shareholder on the 
grounds of a single incident of unfairly prejudicial conduct, even though the trial court had refused 
to permit the defendants to offer live testimony at an evidentiary hearing). But see Regan v. 
Natural Res. Group, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1012 n.7 & 1012-13 (D. Minn. 2004) (holding 
that a terminated shareholder-employee could not have had a reasonable ex~cectation of continued 
employment in light of"the written agreements that [the shareholder-employer] executed, as well 
as [his] past conduct," which included earlier acting as the corporation's CEO in terminating 
another shareholder-employee). 
183 Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 n.16 (S.D. 1997); see also Leslie v. Boston 
Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *1-*6, (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 
12, 2002) (involving initially appealing claims of oppression which, upon scrutiny, were revealed 
as merely disgruntlement over the majority's legitimate exercise of business judgment). 
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fundamental doctrine in the law of business entities than the "business 
judgment rule," and that rule reflects that judiciary's long-standing wisdom 
that courts are poorly equipped to parse through the complexities and 
vagaries of business judgment. 184 
It should be possible to do better than the ALI on this point. The 
author's suggestion for a more predictable and targeted special rule for 
closely-held entities appears in subpart VI.C. 185 
VI. SPECIAL QUERIES WITH REGARD TO LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 
A. Will the Pivotal Role of the LLC Operating Agreement Change or 
at Least Confuse the Direct/Derivative Analysis? 
Although an LLC is created by the public filing of a document, 186 it is 
"[t]he member's contract-their operating agreement-[that] is typically 
the constitution of the enterprise."187 The Delaware Supreme Court has 
characterized the operating agreement as the "cornerstone" of the limited 
liability company,188 and all LLC statutes contemplate the operating 
agreement (however denominated) as the entity's foundational document 
inter se the members. 189 
184 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2nd Cir. 1982) ("[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact 
litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances 
surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since 
business imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect 
information. The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a 
reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a 
background of perfect knowledge."); 2 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 10.05[1] (stating 
that the rule of judicial deference has a sensible rationale and recognizing "that business decision-
making is not an exact science and that a regime of strict liability would chill innovation, deter 
risk-taking and discourage competent individuals from serving"). 
185 See infra notes 231-238 and accompanying text. 
186 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~~ 5.05[1], 5.05[l][b] (explaining that, under all 
state LLC statutes, a specified public official must receive and file a "duly executed constitutive 
document"-typically called the articles of organization-in order to cause an LLC to come into 
existence). 
187 Kleinberger, supra note 2, at 842-43. 
188 See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286,291 (Del. 1999). 
189 For example, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act section 203(c)(l) provides that 
"if any provision of an operating agreement is inconsistent with the articles of organization[,] the 
operating agreement controls as to managers, members, and members' transferees." 6A U.L.A. 
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An LLC's operating agreement is a contract among its members, which 
creates an opportunity for direct/derivative confusion. 190 It is entirely 
proper and even typical for an operating agreement to prescribe standards of 
conduct for those who manage the LLC. As a result, manager misconduct 
that damages the LLC will also be a breach of the contract among the 
members. In such circumstances, it may be tempting to argue that the 
direct/derivative distinction is irrelevant, because certainly a person has 
standing to sue for breach of a contract to which the person is a party. 
Indeed, "[i]n ordinary contractual situations it is axiomatic that each party 
to a contract has standing to sue for breach of that contract."191 
There are two corporate cases that support this view, albeit with meager 
analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court has held that "a shareholder can sue 
for breach of [a] contract to which he is a party, even if he has not suffered 
an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders."192 
The Florida Court of Appeals has relied on the Alaska precedent to reach 
the same conclusion. 193 
These cases do not consider the matter in any depth and have not 
spawned other precedent. More importantly, they are wrongly decided. 
Neither shareholder agreements nor LLC operating agreements are mere 
ordinary contracts. Rather, as authorized by their respective entity statutes, 
they are devices for privately re-ordering the default rules of entity 
governance provided by those statutes. Such agreements are "private 
organic rules,"194 and they fit together with the relevant "public organic 
580 (2003). See generally I BISHOP & KLIENBERGER, supra note 2, 'l/'l/5.06[l][b], 5.06[2](a] 
(explaining that operating agreements "govern[] the members' relationships to each other and to 
the limited liability company" and describing the governance authority granted by state LLC 
statutes to operating agreements). 
190 As for whether the LLC itself is, can or should be a party to the operating agreement, see 
Kleinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 868-72. 
191 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT§ 1001, cmt. 2 (rev. 2001), 6A U.L.A. 102 (2003). 
192 Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska 1986). 
193 See Harrington v. Batchelor, 781 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding 
that a plaintiff shareholder could sue other shareholders directly for breaching the shareholder 
agreement among them, which called for using best efforts to promptly sell the corporation, 
because the plaintiff was a party to the shareholder agreement contract, even though she did not 
suffer an iJ1iwy "separate and distinct" from the other shareholders). 
194 The phrase is taken from the MODEL ENTITY TRANSACTIONS ACT (META) § 102(30) 
(2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blVulc/ueta/20050ctMETAfinal.pdf, which 
defines the term to mean "the rules, whether or not in a record, that govern the internal affairs of 
an entity, are binding on all of its interest holders, and are not part of its public organic document, 
if any." 
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document"195 and "organic law"196 to govern the entity as well as its 
owners. 
Case law involving limited partnerships expresses the correct approach 
for relating the direct/derivative distinction to contracts comprising organic 
rules. The approach is simple and should apply as well to LLCs: an 
agreement among an entity's owners as to the structure, manner or conduct 
of entity governance does not eliminate the direct/derivative issue. 
For example, in Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools, Inc., a limited 
partner attempted a direct action for breach of the limited partnership 
agreement, naming as defendants the general partner and another limited 
partner. 197 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant general partner had 
allowed the defendant limited partner to control the partnership in breach of 
the partnership agreement. 198 For injury, the plaintiff alleged loss of its 
capital contribution and future profits. 199 However, that injury resulted 
from injury to the limited partnership; the plaintiff might have been able to 
show breach but could not have shown direct harm. 200 As a result, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the direct claim.201 
195 A public organic document is "the public record the filing of which creates an entity, and 
any amendment to or restatement of that record." MODEL ENTITY TRANSACTIONS ACT § I 02(32) 
(2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blUulc/ueta/20050ctMETAfinal.pdf. 
196 An entity's organic law comprises "the statutes, if any, ... governing the internal affairs of 
an entity." !d. § 102(26). 
197 969 S.W.2d 625,629-31 (Ark. 1998) ("Actions for breach of the partnership agreement 
may be brought as individual actions or partnership actions, depending on which entity or party is 
primarily injured. Analogizing to corporate law, if the injuries alleged were those for which relief 
should have been granted to the Golf Partnership, and not to an individual partner, then derivative 
action should be the appropriate route for relief.") (citations omitted); see also Contra City P'ship 
Co. v. Jones lntercable, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 576, 580, 591 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding that limited 
partners could bring a direct claim against a general partner who had allegedly breached the 
partnership agreement by using misleading information to try to gain the limited partners' 
approval for a sale of partnership assets to the general partner; stating that "it is difficult to 
understand how the state law breach of contract claim may be brought derivatively since the 
limited partners are parties to the Partnership Agreements, but the Partnerships are not"). Note 
that a disclosure claim may well be a direct claim in any event. See supra notes 125-132; see 
also TIFD III-X LLC v. Fruehauf Prod. Co., L.L.C., 883 A.2d 854, 859--60 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("The 
fact that only [the partners], and not the Partnership itself, are the parties to the Partnership 
Agreement does not transform any breach of the Agreement by one party into a direct harm to the 
other .... "). 
198 Golden Tee, 969 S. W.2d at 629. 
199 !d. 
200 !d. at 629-30. 
201 !d. at 630. 
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A direct claim is proper when the breach of contract directly causes 
mJury. For example, if a limited partnership agreement promises a 
particular percentage of distributions to a particular limited partner and 
without excuse the general partner fails to distribute that percentage to that 
limited partner, the limited partner rather than the partnership suffers injury 
and the partner has a direct claim. 202 
The result is different, however, when a partner's profit percentage falls 
as a result of damage to the enterprise. TIFD III-X LLC v. Fruehauf 
Production Co., L.L.C. illustrates this point.203 The case concerned a 
general partner's claim that a limited partner had breached the partnership 
agreement by taking part in the partnership's operations, causing the 
partnership to reap a smaller amount of profits than it otherwise would 
have, and keeping the partnership from reaching the economic marker at 
which the general partner's share of profits would have risen from one 
percent to twenty-five percent.204 The court held that the claim could not be 
brought directly despite the general partner's status as a signatory of the 
partnership agreement. 205 
The ULPA (2001) codifies the case law rule. 206 Section lOOl(b) 
provides: "A partner commencing a direct action under this section [which 
covers direct actions by partners] is required to plead and prove an actual or 
202 See In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *2-
*4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000); see also infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
203 883 A.2d 854 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
204 I d. at 857. 
205 Id. at *4; see In re Cencom Cable, 2000 WL 130629, at *2-*4 (holding a claim by a class 
of all the limited partners against the general partner for breaching the partnership agreement by 
"improperly terminat[ing] the limited partners' priority cash distributions" could be brought 
directly because the limited partners alone suffered the resulting injury; stating that the defendant 
partner's breach of the partnership agreement by "not valuing the assets on a 'going concern' 
basis" appeared to be a derivative injury because the resulting devaluation harmed the plaintiffs 
only indirectly; ruling that, due to the special circumstances in the case (the partnership was 
dissolved and the limited partners were in an adversarial relationship with the general partner), 
insisting on the direct/derivative distinction made no sense); see also Mieuli v. DeBartolo, No. C-
00-3225 JCS, 2001 WL 777091, at *3, *15-*16 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2001) (holding that a limited 
partner could not directly sue a de facto general partner for allegedly breaching the partnership 
agreement by taking money from the partnership to pay himself and benefit other entities he 
owned without the plaintiffs consent because the injury claimed was a drain on partnership funds: 
"Here, the injury alleged as a result of Defendant's breach of the Partnership Agreement, to the 
extent this claim is based on alleged mismanagement, conversion and self-dealing, is directly to 
the partnership. It is the Partnership that will be entitled to reliefifPiaintitrs claim is proven."). 
206 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIPACT § IOOI(b) (rev. 2001), 6A U.L.A. 102 (2003). 
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threatened injury that is not solely the result of an mJury suffered or 
threatened to be suffered by the limited partnership."207 A comment to the 
section explains that agreements among an entity's owners are not 
"ordinary contractual situations" and that "[w]ithin a limited 
partnership ... different circumstances may exist."208 The comment states 
pointedly that "[a] partner does not have a direct claim against another 
partner merely because the other partner has breached the partnership 
agreement."209 There is no reasonable basis for reaching a different 
conclusion for limited liability companies.210 
207 !d. 
208 !d. cmt. (b). 
209 !d. 
210 Indeed, the current draft of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act takes 
precisely the same approach. See infra notes 297-301; see also Excimer Assocs., Inc. v. LCA 
Vision, Inc., 292 F.3d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether a member of an LLC had a 
direct claim against another for allegedly breaching the operating agreement, by failing to make 
required contributions to the LLC; examining whether the plaintiff member was directly injured 
"independent of any injury [the LLC] may have suffered," not whether the plaintiff was a party to 
the operating agreement; concluding that the case should be remanded to allow the plaintiff to 
"plead its claims of a direct injury with greater particularity"); In re Tri-River Trading LLC, 317 
B.R. 65, 72 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2004) (holding that a member of an LLC could not recover damages 
when the other member breached the operating agreement by failing to purchase freight only 
through the LLC, because the member could not prove the breach had caused her an injury; 
allowing the LLC (which it apparently considered a third-party beneficiary to the contract) to 
recover damages, because it had suffered the direct injury of incurring $800,000 in damages "due 
to the unwinding of contracts"); Metro Cornrnc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecornrn Techs., 
Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 168 (Del. Ch. 2004) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the defendants' alleged 
mismanagement of an LLC gave rise to a direct claim and explaining: "Metro's contention that 
this claim is a direct one because it seeks contractual 'expectation damages' arising from Metro's 
initial decision to enter into the LLC Agreement cannot be accepted. If it were, then every equity 
investor would be able to transform derivative claims alleging harm to the business into direct 
claims merely by casting them as contractual claims based on the original agreement by which the 
investor purchased its equity interest"). For another approach that would end-run the 
direct/derivative distinction, see Diaz v. Fernandez, 910 P.2d 96, 97 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). Diaz 
held that members of an LLC may seek appointment of a receiver on grounds of mismanagement. 
!d. The court reasoned that a member's interest in the LLC is personal property and cited a state 
rule allowing appointment of a receiver to protect a moving party's interest in property. Id. 
(citation omitted). This case has not been followed; a KeyCite search, conducted November 24, 
2005 3:14 PM, showed a number of commentaries but no cases. See also 2 BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 10.01[2][b][i] (stating that "[s]ome LLC statutes and many 
operating agreements give members the direct right to remove a manager on grounds of bad 
performance"). 
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B. Will Claims Asserting Oppression Provide an End-Run Around 
the Direct/Derivative Distinction? 
Like most close corporations, most limited liability companies face the 
"lock in" problem and the corresponding susceptibility of minority owners 
to oppression by those in control.211 LLC case law is already following 
close corporation law; the question for present purposes is whether (and, if 
so, how) the corporate law and developing LLC law adjust the 
direct/derivative distinction in the context of claims of oppression.212 
In many instances, no adjustment is necessary. If those in control 
directly attack the minority's rights or expectations, the resulting claim is 
unquestionably direct. For example, in Ayres v. AG Processing, Inc., the 
minority members of an LLC alleged that they were "terminat[ ed] ... as 
managers, employees and members" after complaining about the 
defendants' management actions.213 Even while using the special injury 
rule, the court had no difficulty recognizing the claim as direct: 
Because Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants' actions 
resulted in damages in the form of a loss to their equity 
ownership in AEP LLC and a decrease in financial benefits 
to them, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged an 
injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other 
members of the LLC 214 
Adjustment is also unnecessary when a minority member or shareholder 
oppression claim is really a claim about mismanagement. The plaintiff will 
not have standing for a direct suit unless the relevant jurisdiction has 
adopted the ALI approach to the direct/derivative distinction.215 
Sometimes permitting a direct claim involves framing the conduct of the 
majority so as to establish a direct or special injury. For example, in 
211 Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need 
for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1609, 1612 (2004); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Company: 
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 926, 956-57 
(2005). 
212 See generally Miller, supra note 211, at 1630--31 (noting that courts have been willing to 
apply close corporation (and partnership) precedents to "police the more obvious patterns of 
opportunistic conduct" in LLCs); 2 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 10.09. 
213 345 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1204, 1208-09 (D. Kan. 2004). 
214 /d. at 1209. 
215 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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Murphy v. Country House, Inc., the court allowed a plaintiff shareholder to 
bring a direct claim against the corporation for paying other shareholders 
(who were employees) what the corporation called "bonuses."216 The 
plaintiff had terminated his employment with the corporation and received 
no bonuses and no dividends.217 
The court might have viewed the complaint as alleging corporate waste 
due to excessive bonuses. If so, the claim would have been derivative. 
Instead, the court held that, although the corporation "neither classified the 
payments as dividends nor distributed the monies ratably according to each 
shareholder's interest, it effectively paid dividends to some of its 
shareholders during its years of surplus profits" and that it must therefore 
give the plaintiff his pro-rata share of the dividends paid others.218 
C. Will the Direct/Derivative Distinction Protect Oppressors Who 
Injure the Entity with "the Purpose and Effect" of Injuring a 
Minority Owner? 
Matters are more complex when those in control target the entity for the 
purpose and effect of injuring an owner.219 In an ALI jurisdiction,220 a court 
will have no difficulty allowing a direct claim. For example, the plaintiff in 
Durham v. Durham alleged a mixed bag of claims-mismanagement, 
exclusion from management, and misuse of corporate resources for personal 
enjoyment by those in control.221 The exclusion might well have been a 
direct claim under a traditional analysis, but not the claims of 
mismanagement and misuse. By adopting a modified version of the ALI 
216 349 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
217 /d. at 291. 
218 /d. at 293. 
219 2 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 10.05[2] n.196.5 (stating that "in closely held 
businesses, majority owners often use usurpation as a method of oppressing minority owners"); 
see, e.g., Marcuccilli v. Ken Corp., 766 N.E.2d 444, 450-51, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
that a trust that was a minority shareholder in two close corporations could not bring direct claims 
against majority shareholders for not disclosing the true terms of sale of a parcel of land belonging 
to one corporation (thus denying the trust compensation of approximately $500,000) and taking 
personal loans at below-market interest rate from the other corporation; following the dismissal 
recommendation of an SLC, which had found that the majority shareholders had breached 
fiduciary duties but had nonetheless determined that the corporations' best interests would be 
served by not pursuing litigation). 
220 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
221 871 A.2d 41, 43 (N.H. 2005). The misuse involved those in control, their family, and their 
friends, having access at below-market rates or for free to cabins owned by the corporation. /d. 
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rule, the New Hampshire Supreme Court granted the trial court discretion to 
determine whether the plaintiff could proceed directly on all his substantive 
claims.222 
Courts that use the special injury approach should also have little 
difficulty handling purpose and effect situations. Almost by definition, 
such situations target for injury one or at most a few owners. Because the 
special injury rule ignores the direct harm aspect of standing, damaging the 
entity to get at the true victim does not undermine the victim's standing.223 
This point can be illustrated nicely with two Delaware Chancery Court 
cases, both decided before Delaware abandoned the special injury rule.224 
In Boyer v. Wilmington Materials, Inc., the court allowed the plaintiff 
shareholder to bring a direct claim based on a special injury when the other 
shareholders had sold the corporation's assets in order to eliminate the 
plaintiff and another shareholder from continuing participation in the 
business. 225 In Fischer v. Fischer, the court permitted a direct claim upon 
allegations that the defendants had sold corporate real estate at an unfairly 
low price to another entity that they owned and had then dissolved the 
corporation, all for the purpose of targeting the plaintiff.226 Although the 
pivotal misconduct inflicted an injury on the corporation, the plaintiff 
nonetheless alleged a special injury not suffered by the other 
shareholders. 227 
In a direct harm jurisdiction, plaintiffs face more significant barriers to 
purpose and effect claims. Neither Boyer nor Fischer would satisfy the 
direct harm analysis, nor, for example, would the following scenario: The 
controlling shareholder "1) paid excessive salaries to himself and other 
family members; 2) used corporate employees to perform services for him 
and other family members without proper compensation to the company; 3) 
dramatically lowered dividend payments [which prejudiced only the 
minority shareholder]; and 4) appropriated company funds for personal 
investments. "228 
222 !d. at 46. The court dismissed as moot a claim for information. !d. at 47. 
223 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
224 For a discussion of Delaware's approach to the direct/derivative distinction, see supra 
notes 102-106, 144-147 and accompanying text. 
225 7 54 A.2d 881, 903 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
226 No. C.A. 16864., 1999 WL 1032768, at •1, •3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 1999). 
221 Id. 
228 Marcuccilli v. Ken Corp., 766 N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Barth v. Barth, 
659 N.E.2d 559 (Ind.1995)). Barth invoked the ALI rule and remanded to the trial court. 659 
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Nor does the direct harm analysis work when minority members of an 
LLC lose the value of their investments because the controlling members 
transfer the LLC's assets for no compensation to other entities owned by 
the controlling members. 229 Nor does the analysis work when the 
controlling member in a two member LLC uses LLC funds to buy property 
for his own account. 230 . 
Earlier in this Article, I argued that the ALI rule is too blunt (or 
indeterminate) an instrument to provide a useable exception to the 
direct/derivative distinction.231 Some years ago, I urged the following 
purpose and effect exception as a substitute for the ALI approach: 
The better rule is to allow transmutation [of a derivative 
claim into a direct claim] ... when the derivative harm has 
occurred with the purpose and effect of causing an injury 
targeted at the minority shareholder. The effect 
requirement precludes claims based on mere allegation of 
N.E.2d at 562-63. On remand in Barth, the trial court exercised its discretion and again dismissed 
the claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. Marcuccilli, 766 N.E.2d at 450. 
229 See PacLink Commc'ns lnt'l, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 437-40 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001) (explicitly applying the corporate direct harm rule to LLCs, holding that the 
plaintiff members had no standing to bring a direct action against other members because the 
plaintiffs were not directly injured and stating: "The injury was essentially a diminution in the 
value of their membership interest in the LLC occasioned by the loss of the company's assets. 
Consequently, any injury to plaintiffs was incidental to the injury suffered by [the LLC]."); see 
also Gottsacker v. Monnier, 697 N.W.2d 436, 439, 442-44 (Wis. 2005). Gottsacker (i) began as a 
direct claim asserting that the majority members lacked the necessary votes to authorize transfer 
of an LLC's principal asset to another company owned by those members; and (ii) morphed on 
appeal to include an issue that arguably involved a derivative claim (whether the transfer was fair 
to the LLC), albeit in an apparently direct context (the question of fairness was determinative of 
whether the votes in favor of the transfer were valid). 697 N.W.2d at 439, 442-43. To add 
complexity, a concurrence suggests that the plaintiff's eventual remedy might be in the form of an 
action for an accounting. /d. at 446 (Roggensack, J., concurring). For a discussion of the 
accounting action in the context ofLLCs, see Kleinberger, Accounting, supra note 159. 
230 See In re Estate of Ziehm, 360 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1974) (allowing a direct 
lawsuit by a former shareholder of a dissolved corporation against the only other shareholder for 
converting corporate funds to purchase personal property: "Given the fact that the only other 
shareholder is petitioner makes it clear that it is the petitioner who would be solely injured by the 
alleged loss or conversion of these said assets."). 
231 See supra Part V. 
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evil intent. The purpose requirement precludes claims that 
reflect mere differences in business judgment .... 232 
Today, I propose the "purpose and effect" approach as a limiting 
clarification to the ALI rule. Such a gloss would provide substantial 
. guidance to courts and go far to resolve the "re-make the deal" dangers 
inherent in the ALI rule. 233 
Careful pleading requirements would limit the "strike suit" dangers.234 
That is, pleadings seeking an exception to the direct/derivative distinction 
should allege, with particularity: 
(i) breaches of the duty of loyalty by the defendants;235 
(ii) how the alleged harm to the entity has had the targeted 
effect of injuring only the plaintiffs and none of the 
defendants; and 
(iii) that not only are all of the owners of the entity parties 
to the litigation236 but also that each is either a targeted 
victim of the misconduct or part of the "control group" 
conumttmg, sanctioning, or benefiting from the 
misconduct. 237 
232 Kleinberger & Bergrnanis, supra note 21, at 1271. For a brief and shining moment one 
court seemed interested in this approach. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 581 N.W.2d 380, 390--91 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999). However, a higher court had other 
ideas. See generally Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999). 
233 For a discussion of these dangers, see supra note 67 and Part !II.D. 
234 For a discussion of these dangers, see supra notes 43, 67. 
235 A purpose and effect case is necessarily a case about oppression, which is intentional 
misconduct. Breaches of the duty of care simply do not qualify. Moreover, permitting breach of 
care claims in this context would open the door wide to mere mismanagement claims, thereby 
resurrecting the "re-make the deal" problem. 
236 This requirement is consonant with the ALI's concern with multiplicity of suits. See supra 
Part V. 
237 The concept of a controlling group is taken from the seminal close corporation case of 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505,518 (Mass. 1975). Donahue 
is instructive in this context because the case's controlling group concept aligned all the 
shareholders as either part of the problem or part of the desired solution. See id. Of course, not all 
disputes within a closely held entity will fit this alignment. E.g., Barth v. Barth, 693 N.E.2d 954, 
958-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiff to proceed 
directly in a case involving a three-shareholder corporation, in part because "there was a third 
shareholder who had not been joined or intervened in the minority shareholder's action, giving 
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In addition, because the decision to allow a derivate claim to proceed 
directly so substantially changes the litigation dynamics and the litigants' 
balance of power, the decision should not be made solely on the 
pleadings.238 Instead, courts should borrow from their jurisprudence of 
temporarily injunctions, take evidence (typically, but not necessarily solely, 
by affidavit), and determine as a preliminary matter whether the facts 
support the allegations.239 This preliminary determination would (i) permit 
defendants to respond with minimum expense to strike suits, while (ii) 
allowing the court to encourage early settlement of cases where the 
defendants have actually despoiled the entity with the purpose and effect of 
targeting one or more minority owners. 
rise to the possibility of multiple actions based on the same allegations, and interference with 
distribution of the damages"). 
238 Compare the Delaware rule to making the "demand excused" determination. See supra 
Part Ill.B. 
239
11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACfiCE & PROCEDURE 
§ 2949 (Supp. 2005) ("Evidence that goes beyond the unverified allegations of the pleadings and 
motion papers must be presented to support or oppose a motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Affidavits are appropriate on a preliminary injunction motion and typically will be offered by both 
parties.") (footnotes omitted); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660, 666 
(2004) (holding that a court considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction must determine 
"whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail on the merits"; affirming 
the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act 
because the government had not presented evidence rebutting the plaintiffs' assertion that there 
were less restrictive alternative ways to achieve the government's goal of protecting children from 
Internet pornography); Goodman v. Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 430 
F.3d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying Illinois law; denying temporary injunction requested by 
chiropractor because in the preliminary hearing on the injunction issue he had presented no 
evidence supporting his claims that the telemarketing calls he wanted to make were protected 
speech and would not harm susceptible individuals); Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 
641, 645-46 (Mass. 1983) (holding that town officials should be granted a preliminary injunction 
preventing a citizen from continuing his allegedly harassing telephone calls; noting that the town's 
submitted affidavits contained specific allegations supported by facts, while the citizen's affidavits 
lacked facts backing up his denials; remanding the case to a lower court with instructions to issue 
the injunction). 
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D. Will Claims Seeking Judicial Dissolution Provide an End-Run 
Around the Direct/Derivative Distinction?240 
To anyone schooled in the law of close corporations, this query may 
seem redundant of the oppression query. In many jurisdictions, courts 
developed protections against close-corporation oppression under the aegis 
of statutes permitting judicially-ordered dissolution. 241 That development is 
certainly possible for LLCs, but many LLC statutes have another provision 
worth contemplating-the "not reasonably practicable" standard.242 
240 An action for an accounting, independent of any dissolution, may also raise end-run issues. 
I seek to address those issues and others related to LLCs and accounting in Kleinberger, 
Accounting, supra note !59. 
241 See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy 
for Close Corporation Dissention, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 25, 35-36 (1987) (discussing statutory 
provisions that allow a close corporation's shareholders to obtain judicial involuntary dissolution 
as relief for oppression). 
242 Indeed, ULLCA section 801(4)(v) authorizes a court to decree dissolution "on application 
by a member or a dissociated member" if the court determines inter alia that "the managers or 
members in control of the company have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, 
oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner." UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT 
§ 801(4)(v) (rev. 1996), 6A U.L.A. 619-20 (2003). The current version of the Revised Uniform 
Limited Liability Companies Act includes a comparable provision. See infra notes 297-301. 
Michigan law authorizes the court to "issue an order or grant relief as it considers appropriate" if it 
determines "that acts of the managers or members in control of the limited liability company are 
illegal, fraudulent or constitute willfully unfair and oppressive conduct [to) the limited liability 
company or [to] the member." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4515 (West 2005). The statute 
provides a non-exclusive list of remedies that includes: 
(a) The dissolution and liquidation of the assets and business of the limited liability 
company. 
(b) The cancellation or alteration of a provision in the articles of organization or in an 
operating agreement. 
(c) The direction, alteration, or prohibition of an act of the limited liability company, or 
of members, managers, or other persons party to the action. 
(d) The purchase at fair value of the member's interest in the limited liability company, 
either by the company or by the managers or other members responsible for the 
wrongful acts. 
Id; see also Gottier's Furniture, LLC v. LaPointe, No. CV040084606, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
3767 (Dec. 21, 2004) (holding that one member of a three-member LLC would not fairly represent 
the LLC, and, therefore, could not bring a derivative suit claiming managerial misconduct by 
another member; remitting the plaintiff to a claim for dissolution; referring to the power of the 
superior court to decree dissolution "if one or more of the members or managers of the limited 
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That standard derives essentially verbatim from the Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (1976/1985), which authorizes a court to decree 
dissolution of a limited partnership "whenever it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership 
agreement."243 By its terms, the action is direct, rather than derivative, and 
many (perhaps most) LLC statutes incorporate the RULPA language.244 
To date, there is scant case law under the LLC version of "not 
reasonably practicable." Virtually all available cases (whether or not 
officially reported) pertain to RULPA, and they involve acrimony rather 
than oppression. Nonetheless, it is possible for the "not reasonably 
practicable" standard to provide relief to a member who alleges unfair 
treatment and thereby moot the question of direct versus derivative harm. 
The very un-Delaware case of Haley v. Talcott provides the first 
reported example.245 In Haley, the Delaware Court of Chancery analogized 
a two-member LLC to a two-shareholder corporation, and held it was no 
longer "reasonably practicable" to carry on the business of an LLC owning 
land on which a restaurant was built.246 The two fifty-percent owners had 
become deadlocked in their management decisions after one member fired 
the other from the operating business (a restaurant). 247 The LLC's 
operating agreement contained an agreed-upon exit mechanism, which 
should have defeated the discontented member's "not reasonably 
practicable claim"-that is, applying the agreed upon exit mechanism 
should have been per se in conformity with the operating agreement.248 The 
Chancery Court determined to the contrary, however, deeming the agreed-
liability company have engaged in wrongful conduct") (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-
208(a)(2)), vacated and superseded by, No. CV040084606, 2005 WL 647795 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 9, 2005) (granting plaintiff's motion to reconsider, recognizing the Connecticut Supreme 
Court precedent regarding close corporations militates for permitting a derivative suit, and 
denying the motion to dismiss). 
243 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT§ 802 (rev. 2001), 6A U.L.A. 469 (2003). 
244 See 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 9.02[7][a][i] (containing an extensive 
analysis of the source and meaning of the "not reasonably practicable standard"). Without doubt, 
far more LLC statutes include such language than include a dissolution remedy keyed to 
"oppression" or "unfair prejudice." /d.~ 9.02[7][a][i]-[ii]. 
245 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
246 /d. at 98. 
247 /d. at 91. 
248 /d. at 91-92. 
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upon exit mechanism actionably inadequate because the exiting member 
would remain personally liable for the mortgage debt of the LLC.249 
In some respects, the Haley decision is shocking.250 The case 
disregards the party's deal, even though the Delaware LLC statute 
proclaims: "It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect 
to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
limited liability company agreements."251 Equally surprising, the case 
imports a provision of the Delaware corporate code into a statute 
whose framers consider it the preeminent unincorporated business 
entity statute in the country. 252 
However, the decision contains no auguries for the direct/derivative 
doctrine. The Haley plaintiff had suffered both direct harm and a special 
injury.253 He had been fired from the operating business that, as a business 
matter, was inextricably linked to the LLC in which he and the person who 
fired him were the only members. 254 
In sum, neither dissolution on account of oppression nor dissolution 
under the "not reasonably practicable standard" are likely to alter materially 
the direct/derivative analysis for LLCs. 
E. In Federal Court, Might the Concerns of Diversity Jurisdiction 
Skew the Direct/Derivative Analysis? 
LLC derivative cases do not belong in federal court. The entity is an 
indispensable party to a derivative suit, and, because an LLC has the 
citizenship of each of its members, a derivative suit necessarily lacks 
diversity.255 However, in a case in which all the members are diverse, a 
249 /d. at 88. 
250 /d. at 93-94 (explaining that, when the two members of a Delaware LLC are deadlocked, 
"Case Law Under § 273 Of The Delaware General Corporate Law ("DGCL '') Provides An 
Appropriate Framework For Analysis"). 
251 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2005). 
252 See Haley, 864 A.2d at 93-97 (stating that case law decided under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 273 should be used to interpret DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802). For an analysis of the 
preeminence of Delaware's LLC Act, see 2 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, ~ 14.01 [2]. 
253 Haley, 864 A.2d at 91. 
254 See id. 
255 See Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2004) ("In a 
derivative action, where there are three parties conceptually presented as 'A' v. 'B' v. 'C,' the 
parties must be aligned for diversity purposes. Generally, the represented entity (i.e., the entity on 
whose behalf the suit is initiated-'B ') ... is aligned as a defendant. But [the entity] can be 
realigned as a plaintiff under certain circumstances. In either case diversity jurisdiction does not 
HeinOnline -- 58 Baylor L. Rev. 129 2006
2006] DIRECT VERSUS DERIVATIVE 129 
court might be tempted to disregard the direct/derivative distinction in order 
to preserve diversity. After all, "all the real parties are here," and 
characterizing a derivative claim as inter se the owners (rather than as 
involving the rights of the LLC) could prevent remand to the state courts. 
Although this attitude is reminiscent of Justice O'Connor's dissent in 
Carden v. Arkoma Associates,256 a few lower courts have indeed "gone 
there" or at least flirted with the concept. The principal example is HB 
General Corp. v. Manchester Partners, L.P., in which the Third Circuit 
held that a limited partnership was not an indispensable party in a suit 
among the partners.257 The court's rationale included a concept of collateral 
estoppel, which rested on a Connor-like notion that the real parties in 
interest are all here: "[T]he Partnership, like a marionette, cannot make a 
move unless some human being pulls the strings. And all the people who, 
under the Partnership Agreement, have the power to cause the Partnership 
to bring suit ... are before the court."258 
A more recent example is Simon v. Mann, decided in 2005 by the 
federal district court in Nevada.259 Expressly in order to preserve federal 
jurisdiction, the court held that Nevada law would allow a close corporation 
exception to the direct/derivative distinction.260 The court relied both on the 
ALI approach261 and on a version of the duty owed notion.262 As to the 
latter, the court stated: 
[T]he special duties owed to minority shareholders in 
closely-held corporations provide a more traditional means 
of obtaining individual relief. "It is well settled that an 
individual cause of action can be asserted when the wrong 
exist.") (citation omitted); GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 
827, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2004); Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 
691, 692-94 (7th Cir. 2003); Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Trowbridge v. Dimitri's 50's Diner L.L.C., 208 F. Supp. 2d 908, 909-10 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see 
generally Carter G. Bishop & DanielS. Kleinberger, Diversity Jurisdiction for LLCs? Basically, 
Forget About It, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2004, at 31. 
256 494 US 185, 198 (1990). Although Carden involved a limited partnership, the case put 
"the handwriting on the wall" for limited liability companies and diversity jurisdiction. 1 BISHOP 
& KLEINBERGER, supra note 2, '1!1.03(3J[a]-[b]. 
257 95 F .3d 1185, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1996). 
258 !d. at 1191. 
259 373 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.Nev. 2005). 
260 !d. at 1199-1200. 
261 See discussion supra notes 177-185. 
262 Simon, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
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is both to the stockholder as an individual and to the 
corporation." Far West Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Office of Thrift 
Supervision-Dir., 119 F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir.1997). 
Here, in addition to the individual wrong alleged by 
Plaintiff Donald Simon in having his director's fees 
terminated by Defendant, all Plaintiffs have alleged the 
wrong of breach of fiduciary duties to minority 
shareholders. An Oregon court allowed a direct action in 
similar circumstances. Noakes v. Schoenborn, 116 Or. 
App. 464,471-72, 841 P.2d 682, 686-87 (1992). The court 
in Noakes noted the special fiduciary duties owed to 
minority shareholders by majority shareholders in closely-
held corporations and found that a breach of those duties, 
such as "attempts to eliminate minority shareholders from 
the enterprise or deprive them of their proportionate powers 
and rights without a just equivalent," constituted the kind of 
individual injury which allowed a shareholder to bring a 
direct suit.263 
Judge Posner has mused in the direction of an even broader 
exception.Z64 In Lejkovitz v. Wagner, a case involving a general partnership, 
he wrote: 
263 !d. 
[A]lthough the corporation or other entity on whose behalf 
a suit is brought, being the owner of the claim sued upon, 
normally is an indispensable party, this observation is 
inapplicable to a suit such as the present one in which the 
partner (or shareholder) is allowed to sue in an individual 
rather than representative capacity. The next step, which 
however we [previously] declined to take ... would be to 
allow a derivative suit to be brought instead as an 
individual suit whenever the corporation (the usual entity 
on behalf of which a derivative suit is brought) is closely 
held, at least where, as in this case (were Jamis [the general 
partnership sub judice] a corporation), all the shareholders 
264 See generally Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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are before the court, so that there are no merely represented 
shareholders. 265 
131 
A similar motivation may have been at work in another Seventh Circuit 
case, Weinstein v. Schwartz, in which the court determined that the 
plaintiffs claim was direct rather than derivative.Z66 The plaintiff 
shareholder sought a declaratory judgment that two other shareholders had 
previously sold their shares in the corporation and therefore could not vote 
on the proposed sale to a third party of a piece of corporate real estate the 
plaintiff was renting in his individual capacity.267 Correctly applying 
Too/ey,268 the court held that the plaintiffs claim was direct because the 
plaintiff: (i) stood to gain directly from a decision in his favor (as he would 
then have the power to block the sale); and (ii) would suffer directly from 
an adverse decision (as he would lose possession of the horse farm he was 
renting from the corporation)_269 
The court's direct/derivative determination meant that the corporation 
could be dismissed from the lawsuit, which preserved complete diversity.270 
A panel of the Second Circuit likewise avoided a remand in Excimer 
Assocs., Inc. v. LCA Vision, Inc., by determining that an LLC member's 
failure to make a promised contribution to the LLC gave rise to a direct 
claim by another member who felt compelled to make up the shortfall.271 
These cases are interesting, but they are not a trend, at least for the 
moment. Judge Posner's musings did not overrule Frank v. Hadesman & 
Frank, Inc., which a decade before rejected a close corporation 
265 /d. at 777 (citations omitted). 
266 See 422 F.3d 476, 477-78 (7th Cir.) (applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 133 
(2005). 
267 /d. at 476-77. 
268 For an explanation of the Delaware court's decision in Tooley, see supra note 144. 
269 See Weinstein, 422 F. 3d at 478. 
270 See id. 
271 See 292 F.3d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2002). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra 
notes 285-288. See also Matz v. Bennion, 961 S.W.2d 445, 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 
1997, pet. denied) (concluding that the Texas statute governing dissolution of partnerships did not 
require the partnership to be a party to such an action as long as all the partners were present: 
"Inasmuch as all the beneficial owners of the partnerships were before the court, it had jurisdiction 
to judicially dissolve the partnerships and appoint a receiver to sell the assets" and holding that the 
lower court had jurisdiction to dissolve a partnership in a proceeding to enforce an exchange of 
property ordered in arbitration even though the partnership was not a party because both of the 
partners and the assignee of one of their interests were parties to the action). 
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exception,272 and HB General Corp. has not been followed. 273 Weinstein 
and Exicmer are correct on the merits, and Simon involved not only facially 
direct claims but also a situation in which the purpose and effect of the 
injury to the entity was to inflict injury on the minority shareholders.274 
There is, therefore, no substantial reason to believe that federal diversity 
concerns will distort the direct/derivative analysis for limited liability 
compames. 
F. Has the LLC's Partnership Heritage Liberated Courts to Find a 
New Kind of Direct Injury? 
In this context, "partnership heritage" means viewing the LLC primarily 
as the result of an agreement among its members and not primarily as a 
free-standing entity.275 From this perspective, one member's breach of an 
agreed duty occasions an inquiry into the consequential damages suffered 
by the other members and the efforts those other members might make to 
avoid or mitigate those damages. Put practically-notwithstanding legal 
fictions of juridical entities as separate persons-if one member defaults, 
another may have to step in and, in doing so, may suffer direct injury. 
Partnership cases recognize this practical reality and allow partners who 
have stepped in to bring direct claims against those who wrongfully stepped 
272 83 F.3d 158, 161--62 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing policy concerns and also noting that the 7th 
Circuit, as a federal court, could not change applicable state law). 
273 To the contrary, LLC cases view the LLC as an indispensable party. See, e.g., Weber v. 
King, 110 F. Supp. 2d 124, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding, in a lawsuit among an LLC's three 
feuding members, that the LLC was a necessary and indispensable party, even though all of its 
members were involved in the lawsuit: "Plaintiffs cannot argue that the presence of all members 
of the Company before the Court is sufficient to protect the interests of the Company. Under New 
York's Limited Liability Company Law (N.Y.LLCL), an LLC is a 'separate legal entity.' ... [I]t 
has rights and obligations which are separate and distinct from those of its members. It follows 
that the Company's interests may also be distinct from those of its members.") (citations omitted); 
Trademark Retail, Inc. v. Apple Glen Investors, LP, 196 F.R.D. 535, 541-42 (N.D. Ind. 2000) 
(involving a claim by one member of a two member LLC that the other member had unreasonably 
refused to lease space in the LLC's shopping mall so that one of the other member's investors 
could lure tenants away to his own commercial space; holding that the LLC was a necessary and 
indispensable party, necessitating the dismissal of the suit for lack of diversity; stating that it was 
insufficient simply to have both LLC members involved in the lawsuit, because LLCs are 
considered separate legal entities, with the right to sue in their own names and with rights and 
obligations distinct from those of its members, and because here the LLC's separate interests were 
threatened by the defendant's behavior and needed to be protected). 
274 For a discussion of the proposed purpose and effect test, see supra Part VI. C. 
275 K.Ieinberger, Prism, supra note 2, at 868-72. 
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out. For example, the court in Hansford v. Maplewood Station Business 
Park permitted plaintiff partners to recover funds they had to advance when 
the defendant partner refused to contribute to cover the partnership's 
development costs and pay off a partnership bank note.276 The partnership 
dissolved, and the appellate court held that the trial court "properly ordered 
the partnership property applied to discharge the partnership's liabilities and 
[the defendant partner's] debt to the remaining partners, which consisted of 
their contributions to cover his obligations to the partnership."277 
Canton West Associates v. Miller reflects the same approach.278 After 
one partner failed to make $142,000 in capital ·contributions required under 
the partnership agreement, the other partners dissolved the partnership, re-
formed it without the defaulting partner, and contributed more capital to 
pay down the partnership's debt.279 Those partners then sought payment 
from the defaulting partner.280 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting 
that: (i) the original partnership agreement "clearly imposed" the obligation 
to pay capital contributions equal to those paid by the other partners; and 
(ii) that the applicable Connecticut statute gave partners the right to claim 
damages from a partner who caused dissolution in breach of the partnership 
agreement. 281 
Both Hansford and Canton West Associates involved claims pressed 
post-dissolution and relied on statutes calling for the settling of accounts 
inter se the partners during winding up.282 The dissolution of the 
partnership may have helped the courts see one partner's nonperformance 
as the direct cause of another partner's loss. 
But dissolution does not eliminate the separate legal person (whether a 
partnership or an LLC),283 and dissolution vel non should not be 
276 621 N.E.2d 347,349,351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). 
277 /d. at 351 (relying on a Uniform Partnership Act provision permitting partners to recover 
against co-partners who have wrongfully caused dissolution). 
278 See 688 A.2d 1360, 1361--63 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995). 
279 /d. at 1361--62. 
280 !d. at 1362. 
281 !d. at 1363. 
282 Hansford, 621 N.E.2d at 349, 356 (citing Ind. Code§ 23-4-1-40); Canton W Assocs., 688 
A.2d at 1363 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 34-76(2)(a)). Both of these statutes are part of the original 
Uniform Partnership Act§ 38 (1914). 
283 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT OF 1914 § 30, vol. 6, pt. 2 U.L.A. 354 (2001) (partnership not terminated 
by dissolution); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 802 (rev. 1997), vol. 6, pt. 1 U.L.A. 197-98 (2001) 
(partnership continues after dissolution); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 802 (rev. 1996), 6A U.L.A. 
623 (2003) (limited liability company continues after dissolution); see DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, 
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determinative.284 In 2002, a panel of the Second Circuit made a Hansford-
and Canton West Associates-like analysis in the context of LLCs and 
without reference to dissolution statutes.285 One member of a two-member 
LLC failed to make promised contributions, and the other member sued 
asserting a direct claim.286 In the district court, the judge read the complaint 
as asserting a claim belonging to the LLC: 
In its complaint, LCA [the plaintiff member of Excimer 
LLC] does not seek to recover the additional contributions 
it claims it made to Excimer due to the P.C.'s [the other 
member's] alleged breach of its agreement to make capital 
and other contributions. Rather, LCA seeks to recover the 
money it claims the P.C. failed to contribute to 
Excimer .... The injury for which LCA seeks recompense 
is neither direct nor independent of Excimer. 287 
The Second Circuit reversed, having read the plaintiffs complaint in a 
kinder, gentler way: 
The last paragraph of Count One states that "[LCA] has 
been damaged by the refusal of [PC] to pay the amount 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS§ 11.2.1, at 330 (stating 
that "[d]issolution [under the UPA] does not end the partnership"); id. § ll.ll.J, at 373 (stating 
that "[d]issolution [under RUPA] does not end the partnership but instead commences a period of 
winding up"). A brief New York appellate decision ignores this fact, suggesting that the 
direct/derivative distinction is moot once an LLC is dissolved. ME Corp. S.A. v. Cohen Bros. 
LLC, 739 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
284 See !-Enterprises Co., LLC v. Draper Fisher Jurvetson Mgrnt. Co. V, LLC, No. C-03-
1561MMC, 2005 WL 1661959, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2005) ("Here, !-Enterprise does not 
allege that defendants' Detrimental Acts reduced the value of the partnerships' assets, and 
consequently injured !-Enterprise. Such a claim would be a derivative claim, as the injury to !-
Enterprise would be incidental to the injury to the assets of the partnerships. Rather, !-Enterprise 
now seeks to recover damages for defendants' alleged failure to provide contractually-owed notice 
of their wrongdoing to !-Enterprise, which prevented it from taking actions to protect its own 
interests by (a) withholding further capital contributions; (b) selling its limited partnership interest 
in Fund V or VI; (c) seeking judicial dissolution of the Partnerships; or (d) obtaining a vote of 
two-thirds in interest of the limited partners to terminate the Partnerships. As noted in the 
December 15 Order, a claim for failure to provide notice to the limited partners is a direct claim.") 
(citations omitted). 
285 See Excirner Assocs., Inc. v. LCA Vision, Inc., 292 F.3d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2002). 
286 /d. at 136--37. 
287 Cabrini Dev. Council v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations 
omitted), rev'd, Excirner Assocs., Inc. v. LCA Vision, Inc., 292 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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demanded of it, by having lost the additional amounts 
contributed by [LCA] to Excimer." Thus, the district 
court's statement that "LCA does not seek to recover the 
additional contributions it claims it made to Excimer" is 
questionable since, construing the complaint in LCA's 
favor, as we must, this may well be what LCA is arguing. 
In other words, LCA appears to claim that, as a result of 
PC's breach of the Operating Agreement, LCA contributed 
$495,218.93 over and above that which it was contractually 
obligated to pay, and it is now seeking to recover that 
amount from PC. Such a claim would seek recovery for a 
direct injury to LCA that is independent of any injury 
Excimer may have suffered.288 
135 
The Second Circuit's Excimer decision was presaged by a Connecticut 
state court trial decision,289 but the two cases have hardly started a tidal 
wave?90 The Excimer theory may be useful in limited circumstances, but 
288 Excimer, 292 F.3d at 140; cf lnt'l Flavors & Textures, LLC v. Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552, 
554 (W.O. Mich. 1997) (holding that a claim against a member for an unpaid contribution was 
derivative, not direct, because the "IFT Operating Agreement specifically gives IFT [(i.e., the 
limited liability company)], not just a member of IFT, the right to take 'enforcement action' to 
collect a member's capital contribution"). 
289 See Taurus Advisory Group, Inc. v. Sector Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 960150830, 1997 WL 
241153, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6, 1997) (allowing a direct claim where the alleged damage 
to the LLC caused an innocent corporate member "to take over the operations [of the LLC] at the 
expense of its own operations"). 
290 0n November 21, 2005: (i) a Westlaw search in the ALLCASES database for "Taurus 
Advisory" showed several cases citing that litigation, but none relating to the direct/derivative 
issue; (ii) a Westlaw KeyCite search on Excimer showed 15 cases citing Excimer but only one 
cite involved a headnote related to the direct/derivative distinction and that citing case referred 
also to and relied on New Y ark case law pointing in the opposite direction. See Solutia Inc. v. 
FMC Corp., 385 F. Supp. 2d 324, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an LLC member's 
"additional expenditures [resulting from another member's alleged failure to contribute 
technology to the LLC] do not constitute a direct injury sufficient to give [the plaintiff member] 
standing" to sue directly; citing Abrams v. Donati, 489 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1985), for the 
proposition "that a shareholder has no individual cause of action for harm to the corporation that 
causes the shareholder to 'incur personal liability in an effort to maintain the solvency of the 
corporation"'). Ultimately, Excimer was equally unproductive for the plaintiff. See LCA-Vision, 
Inc. v. New York Refractive Eye Assocs., P.C., No. 98 Civ.8387 DC, 2004 WL 213027, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004) (concluding on remand from the Second Circuit that no reasonable jury 
would sustain the plaintiff's breach of contract claim and, therefore, granting summary judgment 
to the defendant). 
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neither it nor LLC's "partnership law heritage" seem likely to significantly 
affect the direct/derivative analysis for limited liability companies. 
VII. How THE REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT 
PROPOSES TO ADDRESS THE MATTER 
In 2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) began a project to revise the original Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act.291 The drafting committee presented an initial 
report at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Conference, and a draft of a new, 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (Re-ULLCA) was read in 
part (line by line) at the Conference's 2004 Annual Meeting.292 The Act 
received its formal first reading at the 2005 Annual Meeting293 and is 
scheduled for its final reading at the 2006 Annual Meeting. 
From the first very tentative draft, the new Act has taken seriously the 
direct/derivative distinction and embraced the direct harm rule. Borrowing 
from ULPA (2001) § IOOI(b)/94 the April 2004 draft of Re-ULLCA 
provided that: "A member commencing a direct action under this section 
[governing direct actions by members] is required to plead and prove an 
actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered 
or threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company."295 The 
Reporters' Notes quoted the Comment to the ULPA provision, which 
explains that a breach of a partnership agreement does not automatically 
give each party to that agreement standing to sue directly for breach.296 
291 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REv. OF UNIF. 
LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT 6 (Preliminary Report Annual Meeting 2003), available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/biUulc/ullcalann-meet-draft03.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). The author serves as one 
of two co-reporters for this drafting project, but the statements and opinions in this Article are 
solely his own and are not the position of the NCCUSL, the drafting committee, the committee's 
chair, the other co-reporter or any member, advisor to or observer of the drafting committee. 
292 Drafting Committee, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Presentation of Initial Report at the Fifth Session (Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act) of the 2003 Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2004) (transcript on file with the author). 
293 Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform 
Law Group To Meet in Pittsburgh (July 11, 2005), http://nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/ 
NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemiD=l42 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
294 This provision is discussed supra notes 206-210. 
295 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDS. TO 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 90i(b) (Meeting Draft Mar. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/b!Vulc/ullcaiApr2004MtgDraft.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
296 !d. § 90 I (b) reporters' note. 
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Subsequent Re-ULLCA drafts have preserved this approach and have 
also addressed the "duty owed" issue and the relationship of oppression 
claims to the direct/derivative distinction. 297 On the "duty owed" issue, the 
new Act takes care to prevent confusion between duty and standing. 
Section 409, which delineates the duties of care and loyalty of those who 
manage an LLC, recognizes that some aspect of those duties may extend to 
members as well as the LLC.298 However, the section expressly subjects 
any resulting rights of a member to the direct harm requirement of Section 
901(b).299 
On the question of oppression, the new Act provides for dissolution 
inter alia: 
[O]n application by a member, a dissociated member that 
has retained a transferable interest, or a transferee, the entry 
by [appropriate court] of an order dissolving the limited 
liability company on the grounds that the managers or those 
members in control of the limited liability company: 
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is 
illegal or fraudulent; or 
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive 
and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant. 300 
For a claim of illegal or fraudulent conduct, standing is available without 
regard to injury. But for the far more important subcategory of oppressive 
conduct, the Act expressly incorporates the direct harm approach.301 
297
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REV. UNlF. 
LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 901(b) (Draft Annual Meeting 2005). available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edulbll!ulc/ullca/2005annrntgdraft.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
298 See, e.g., id. § 409 reporters' notes (explaining that in some circumstances those who 
manage an LLC might have a duty of disclosure running directly to the members). 
299 !d. § 409(a) ("A member owes to the limited liability company and, subject to Section 
90 I (b), the other members the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care stated in subsections (b) and 
(c)."). Subsections (b) and (c) repeated the "subject to" phrase, and section 409(£)(2) provides that 
"[i]n a manager-managed limited liability company ... a manager is held to the same standards of 
conduct prescribed for a member in subsections (a) through (d) .... " !d. § 409. 
300 !d. § 701(a)(5). Subsection (b) authorizes a court to grant a lesser remedy. !d. § 701(b). 
At its February 2006 meeting, the Drafting Committee voted to ~elete "transferee." 
301 The new Act also removed language referring to an action for an accounting. The 
reporters' note provides the following explanation: 
At its February, 2005 meeting, the Drafting Committee deleted [from the section 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The spread of limited liability companies creates both the need and the 
opportunity for courts to re-examine the important question of "direct 
versus derivative" in closely held business enterprises. The analysis should 
be the same for both closely held corporations and LLCs, and courts should: 
(i) reject the special injury rule; (ii) embrace the direct harm analysis; and 
(iii) engraft to the ALI exception the more determinate inquiry of "purpose 
and effect." 
providing for direct actions by members] the reference to "with or without an 
accounting," on the theory that partnership remedy of accounting reflected the 
aggregate nature of a partnership and is inappropriate for an entity such as an LLC. A 
comment will explain this point and make clear that the equitable claim for an 
accounting (in the nature of a constructive trust) is unaffected. 
/d. § 90l(a) reporters' notes. 
